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
Egypt is a central country in the Arab World, not 
only for its demographic (more than 80 million 
inhabitants at the last estimate) and geopolitical 
importance, but also historically as a laboratory for 
the evolving regional political dynamics. In recent 
decades, Egypt’s ruling elites have successfully 
embarked on a neo-authoritarian restructuring that 
did grant the country political stability but at the 
cost of a general decline in the country’s economic 
and political influence in the region, and 
domestically, in an increase in social inequalities 
and an excessive reliance on coercion.1 
President Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule ended 
abruptly on February 11, 2011, after little more than 
two weeks of an extraordinary mass protest in the 
wake of the unrest in Tunisia that had led to the 
ousting of the Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali. Today, Egypt is being governed by the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which is 
supervising the country’s political transition 
towards a still undecided future. The period since 
Mubarak resigned has been one of great 
uncertainty, but also great optimism. Regime 
opposition has been transformed into a democratic 
movement, in an Egypt now ruled by largely 
unknown generals. Parliament has been dissolved, 
whilst the Supreme Council has arrogated to itself 
the right to issue decrees citing legal sanction. After 
formally assuming power, the military has 
suspended the 1971 Constitution and appointed a 
constitutional committee to quickly address the 
most urgent amendments. The most significant of 
these amendments include those related to 
 
1 On the main features of neo-authoritarian regimes in the 
Arab World see Guazzone et al. (2009). 
presidential term limits, the necessity of appointing 
a vice-president, and provisions for drafting a new 
constitution by a commission chosen by the new 
parliament. Parliamentary and presidential 
elections will probably also be scheduled for 
September and November 2011, respectively. 
The constitutional committee’s proposed amend-
ments were subjected to a popular referendum on 
March 19. Post-Mubarak, Egypt’s first vote saw an 
unprecedented voter turn-out of 41 percent with 77 
percent voting in favor. A majority in the popular 
protest movement has, however, denounced the 
amendments as inadequate. They have expressed 
concerns about an excessively fast transition that 
may not permit the largely spontaneous popular 
movement to organize and to acquire sufficient 
experience and resources to compete in elections 
against the former regime’s clientele-based 
networks as well as against the main traditional 
opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Since Mubarak’s fall, observers and activists alike 
have debated whether the January-February events 
can best be described as a popular revolt (or even a 
revolution as Egyptians like to call it) or a military 
coup. Events in the coming months will provide an 
answer to that question. At this particular juncture, 
it can be affirmed that two related but separate 
processes had occurred in parallel: on one hand, 
sustained street protests, later joined by labor 
strikes, held their ground with remarkable courage 
in the face of regime repression and the authorita-
rian tactics of divide-and-rule; on the other hand, it 
was the military takeover that finally ousted 
Mubarak. Little is known of intra-regime 
bargaining — within the military, between the 
military and the president, between the military and 
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the loyalist Republican Guard, between the military 
and elements of the civilian leadership and, last but 
not least, between the military and foreign powers. 
To be precise, while it is correct to speak of a 
revolution in terms of people breaking former 
taboos to the point of significantly diminishing the 
regime’s power of coercion, at least in the weeks 
following January 25 (al-Ghobashi 2011), a 
revolutionary outcome is far from guaranteed.  
The bulk of the neo-authoritarian regime has 
survived the end of the Mubarak era, not only in 
terms of the military taking over but also as far as 
the ruling elites (with the exception of the Mubarak 
clan and the top echelons of the regime) and well-
established old political dynamics are concerned. 
Also, the country today is obviously facing the same 
old problems, such as economic decline, rapid 
impoverishment of large sections of society, decline 
in the country’s influence in foreign policy, a largely 
clientelistic and nonrepresentative political system 
and lack of an organized opposition. 
This report provides an analysis of Egypt’s current 
status by focusing more on structural and long–
term dynamics than on everyday politics. As stated 
in this report’s title, the authors still consider Egypt 
a neo-authoritarian state for all practical purposes, 
although they acknowledge that the end of the 
Mubarak era might lead to a political transition in 
terms of a ruling coalition reshuffle or adjustments 
in the domestic and international balance of power. 
Whether Egypt will become a more representative 
country, however, still remains to be seen. Part of 
the aim of this work is to highlight some of the 
possible obstacles to this desirable outcome. 
A first draft of the present report was written in 
December 2010 and discussed at a seminar at the 
International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome on 
January 21, 2011. While the authors could not 
foresee the rapid unfolding of events and, most of 
all, the rise of a vibrant and spontaneous popular 
mobilization largely external to the traditional 
opposition structures, much of their analysis is not 
only valid, but also useful today, due precisely to the 
already mentioned structural approach of the 
research. 
The report is made up of four papers. The first 
paper, by Maria Cristina Paciello, focuses on Egypt’s 
socio-economic profile. In particular, the author 
develops the argument that, in spite of the positive 
macro-economic trends in the last decade, the 
hardships of a large number of Egyptians, 
particularly those belonging to the lower-middle 
classes have increased so that, rather than referring 
to Egypt as a “success story,” it is more correct to 
speak of an emerging “social question” in the 
country.  
In the second paper, Issandr El Amrani provides a 
perspective on the evolution of the National 
Democratic Party (NDP), the former ruling party of 
Egypt, focusing mainly on the decade before the 
ousting of Hosni Mubarak. Indeed, in order to 
grasp the real direction of the current political tran-
sition, it is important to understand how 
institutions like the NDP kept their hold on power 
and increasingly turned Egypt into a “mafia state.”  
In the third paper, Daniela Pioppi analyses the state 
of health of Egypt’s main opposition force, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, after 40 years of co-existence 
with the regime. The author argues that not only the 
TRANSITION TO WHAT: EGYPT’S UNCERTAIN DEPARTURE 
FROM NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM  
5 


regime’s repression, but also the Brotherhood’s 
overly compliant approach towards the ruling 
establishment, has diminished the Islamic 
Brotherhood’s organizational strength and mass 
base as well as its capacity to produce an original 
political agenda. This state of affairs is confirmed by 
in the Brotherhood’s late appearance and modest 
role in the popular mobilization of January-
February 2011.  
Finally, in the fourth paper, Philippe Droz-Vincent 
tackles the status of Egypt’s foreign policy, demon-
strating how the country has been progressively 
marginalized in the past decade, and how it has  
found itself increasingly unable to act 
independently of its long-time partner and patron, 
the United States. 
 
This report is one of several exploring the evolving 
perceptions and policies of Mediterranean actors. 
These studies were produced in the framework of the 
multi-year GMF-IAI strategic partnership, and co-
published by IAI and GMF's Mediterranean Policy 
Program. 
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
On February 11, 2011, an unprecedented mass 
mobilization involving diverse social, religious, 
political, and generational constituencies, forced 
Hosni Mubarak to step down after 30 years in 
power. A combination of political and socio-
economic factors lie at the root of the mass and 
spontaneous mobilization that led to the overthrow 
of Hosni Mubarak. Politically, Egypt has 
experienced a dramatic involution in recent years, 
which has contributed to frustrating any expecta-
tion for political change through the accepted 
channels.2 Since 2005, the Egyptian regime 
increasingly restricted the political space and 
undermined the opposition (Sullivan, 2009; el-
Ghobashy, 2010, Shehata, 2009; Dunne and 
Hamzawy, 2010; Ottaway, 2010). The murder of the 
young businessman, Khaled Saieed, in June 2010, 
revealed the brutality of the regime and led to the 
politicization of many Egyptians, particularly the 
youth.3 The regime’s politics of political exclusion 
culminated in the 2010 November elections that led 
to a parliament where no independent opposition 
was present. Insofar as only parties that won seats in 
parliament were eligible to nominate a presidential 
candidate for the next presidential elections, this 
definitely set the stage for a hereditary succession 
for Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal, or any other 
candidate selected by Hosni Mubarak himself.  
 
2 See ICG (2011) and Ashraf Khalil, “Dispatches From Tahrir: 
Inside Egypt’s revolution and the last days of Mubarak,” 
March 3, 2011, 
http://www.rollingstoneme.com/index.php?option=com_cont
ent&view=article&id=94. 
3 Ivi. The “We Are All Khaled Saieed” Facebook page became 
one of the main gathering points for the organizers of the 
protests that forced Mubarak to step down. 
Economically, over the 2003–04/2006–07 period, 
Egypt experienced strong economic growth, which 
peaked to 7.1 percent in 2006–07,4 with a rapid 
increase in exports and foreign direct investment 
inflows.5 These made Egypt one of the Middle East’s 
fastest growing economies and prompted the Inter-
national Monetary Fund to praise it as “an 
emerging success story” (Achcar, 2009). However, 
in spite of these positive macro-economic indica-
tors, the hardships of a large number of Egyptians 
increased, particularly those belonging to lower-
middle classes, suggesting that the benefits of rapid 
economic growth were not equally distributed. The 
global financial crisis, which spread to Egypt at the 
end of 2008-early 2009, further exacerbated the 
country’s socio-economic situation. Reflecting the 
increased hardship of a large number of Egyptians 
since mid-2004, Egypt was experiencing an 
unprecedented wave of social protests and labor 
strikes,6 which continued through 2010, extending 
 
4 Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 3.2 percent 
in 2002–03, 4.1 percent in 2003–04, 4.5 percent in 2004–05, 
and 6.8 percent in 2005–06 (IMF, 2006). 
5 FDI increased from US$ 400 million in 2000–01 to $ 13.2 
billion in 2007–08. As a result, according to the World Invest-
ment Report 2008, Egypt was ranked as the top country in 
Africa, and the second in the MENA region (after Saudi 
Arabia) in attracting FDI. Exports of goods and services 
tripled from 2003 to 2008 (Radwan, 2009). 
6 These protests were important in preparing the ground for 
the January 25 revolution (Hossam el-Hamalawy, “Egypt’s 
revolution has been 10 years in the making,” The Guardian, 
February 2, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/egyp
t-revolution-mubarak-wall-of-fear). However, although the 
labor protests were successful in attracting an unprecedented 

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
to those private sector workers whose companies 
were affected by the financial crisis (Beinin, 2009; 
Clément, 2009; Beinin and el-Halamawy, 2007a, 
2007b).7  
Bearing in mind that the socio-economic realities 
and political dynamics are both important to 
explain Egypt’s popular upheaval, a detailed analysis 
of the socio-economic reality that was at the heart of 
the Egyptian revolution is provided in this paper, to 
substantiate that over the last decade, behind the 
image of a “success story,” Egypt has indeed been 
confronted with the emergence of a social question. 
The paper will conclude with a brief discussion of 
the socio-economic challenges facing the country in 
the post-Mubarak era. 
  
number of people, they failed to translate into a real political 
challenge to the regime, because, unlike the January-February 
2011 protests, they remained focused on socio-economic 
problems and did not put forward political demands (El-
Mahdi, 2010; Hamzawy, 2009; Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011). 
7 “Labor unrest persists among private sector workers,” Al-
Masry al-Yom, August 6, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/labor-unrest-pers-
ists-among-private-sector-workers. 
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A first indicator of the increasing social deteriora-
tion in Egypt over the past ten years is that income 
poverty has been steadily on the rise. After 
increasing in the first half of the 1990s, income 
poverty started to fall in the second half for the first 
time since the early 1980s, albeit not for the poorest 
region of Upper Egypt (Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy, 
2006; Harrigan and el-Said, 2009). However, from 
2000 to 2005, there was a reversal in the gains made 
in previous years. All measures of absolute poverty 
were found to have increased:8 the incidence of 
poverty increased from 16.7 to 19.6 percent, the 
depth of poverty from 3.0 to 3.6 percent, and the 
severity from 0.8 to 1 percent. Extreme poverty9 
increased as well, from 2.9 to 3.8 percent of Egypt’s 
population. The only positive sign was that the 
percentage of the near-poor (or vulnerable people) 
to poverty10 for the total population declined from 
25.9 percent to 21.0 percent (World Bank, 2007). In 
recent years, according to estimates provided by 
UNICEF (2010), the proportion of people living in 
absolute poverty has continued to increase, reaching 
 
8 Absolute poverty is calculated using the total poverty line 
and therefore consists of spending less than needed to cover 
absolutely minimal food and non-food needs. Egyptians who 
in 2005 reported spending less than LE 1,423 are poor. 
9 Extreme poverty is defined using the food poverty line and 
therefore it means inability to provide even for basic food. 
Egyptians who in 2005 reported spending less than LE 995 on 
average per year are considered extreme poor. 
10 Near poverty is defined using upper poverty line and is 
equivalent to spending barely enough to meet basic food and 
slightly more than essential non-food needs. Egyptians who in 
2005 spent on average between LE 1,424 and LE 1,854 per year 
are considered “near-poor.” 
23.4 percent in 2008–09, up from 19.6 percent in 
2004–05. By 2008–09 the number of income poor 
people had reached 16.3 million persons, compared 
to 13.7 million persons in 2005.  
Yet, the poverty estimates and trends presented 
above are likely to be highly underestimated for a 
number of reasons. As Sarah Sabry (2009) demon-
strates in her interesting research on eight informal 
settlements (ashwa’iyyat) in Greater Cairo, 
conducted between November 2007 and November 
2008, these poverty estimates do not reflect the real 
life of many Egyptians. For example, while informal 
settlements house a significant proportion of the 
urban poor, particularly in Greater Cairo, the 
household surveys that support the above poverty 
line studies continue to under-sample people living 
there, as data on the extent of slum populations is 
not available. Moreover, World Bank poverty lines, 
even the most generous ones, are set too low for an 
acceptable standard of living for residents of 
Greater Cairo’s ashwa’iyyat.11 
Related to this trend of increased income poverty, 
consumer purchasing power in Egypt has signifi-
cantly declined over the last decade. While a 
significant reduction in the inflation rate was one of 
the main achievements of the stabilization program 
in the 1990s, the consumer price index (CPI) went 
up in the 2000s. After the Egyptian pound was 
devaluated in 2003, the CPI shot up in October 
 
11 For example, Sabry (2009) found that poor people who live 
in informal areas, especially on the outskirts of Greater Cairo, 
sometimes paid much more for the same food items than 
those who live in some of the more well-off areas of Egypt. 
1 
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2004, reaching a rate of 11.3 percent,12 mainly 
driven by a rise in the prices of food, beverages, and 
tobacco (Alissa, 2007; World Bank, 2007). After 
dropping between mid-2004 and early 2006, the 
CPI started to rise again due to soaring global food 
prices, reaching its unprecedented peak at 23.6 
percent in August 2008. Consumer prices for wheat 
flour, rice, and maize increased by more than 100 
percent and those for vegetable oils increased by 70 
percent (UNICEF, 2010). The rise in bread prices 
led to serious food riots in April 2008, which 
claimed 11 lives . In late 2010, although food 
inflation was lower compared to 2008, it remained 
quite high and volatile.13 In October 2010, for 
example, vegetable prices shot up 51 percent, while 
meat and poultry increased by nearly 29 percent, so 
 
12 Previously, in 2001–02, the CPI was 2.4 percent. Then, it 
increased to 3.2 percent in 2002–03 and further to 8.1 percent 
in 2003–04 (Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy, 2006; UNICEF, 
2010). 
13 Niveen, Wahish, “Of prices and interest rates,” Al-Ahram 
Weekly, February 19-25, 2009 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/935/ec2.htm); Ali Abdel 
Mohsen, “Meat market mystery,” Al-Masry al-Youm, April 2, 
2010, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/meat-market-
mystery; “Egypt inflation steady in October, rates seen on 
hold,” Al-Masry al-Youm, November 10, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/egypt-inflation-
steady-october-rates-seen-hold; Ashraf Khalil, “Egypt’s vege-
table crisis: ‘This is how revolutions start’,” Al-Masry al-Youm, 
October 26, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/egypt’s-vegetable-
crisis-how-revolutions-start. 
that people could not even afford to buy 
vegetables.14  
The inflationary trend observed over the last decade 
has had a disproportionate effect on the Egyptian 
people, particularly on the middle and lower 
income groups, as a large share of their income gets 
spent on food (Klau, 2010). Much of the observed 
increase in income poverty can therefore be attri-
buted to soaring food prices. Moreover, as several 
anecdotal accounts show,15 as a result of recent 
rising food prices many Egyptian households are 
forced to change their diet to cheaper and less 
nutritious staples, with negative implications for 
their children’s health.16 
The Egyptian government under Hosni Mubarak 
did try to mitigate the negative impact of rising 
prices and growing dissatisfaction among the pop-
ulation by continuing to finance the country’s 
expensive food subsidy system. In 2008, the gov-
ernment even expanded the coverage of the ration 
card subsidy system by an extra 22 million people 
 
14 Prices of tomatoes spiraled more than 600 percent. Ashraf 
Khalil, “Egypt’s vegetable crisis: ‘This is how revolutions 
start’,” Al-Masry al-Youm, October 26, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/egypt’s-vegetable-
crisis-how-revolutions-start. 
15 Ulrike Putz, “The Daily Struggle for Food,” 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,548300,00.h
tml; Ahraf Khalil, “Amid soaring beef prices, poor Egyptians 
brace for meat-less Eid,” Al-Masry al-Youm, November 14, 
2010, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/amid-soaring-
beef-prices-poor-egyptians-brace-meat-less-eid. 
16 Results from the 2008 Egypt Demographic and Health 
Survey (EDHS) show that the nutritional status of young 
children worsened over 2005–08 (FAO, 2009). 
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and increased the quantities of already subsidized 
food items for all ration card holders (Klau, 2010). 
As a consequence, the food subsidy ratio to GDP 
increased from 1.5 percent in 2005–06 to 2.1 
percent in 2008–09 (Aboulenein et al., 2010). The 
government also raised the salaries of civil ser-
vants.17 For example, the annual social bonus of civil 
servants rose steadily from 10 percent in 2006, to 15 
percent in 2007 and to 30 percent in 2008 
(Abdelhamid and el-Baradei, 2009).  
However, the measures put in place by the Egyptian 
government to mitigate the negative impact of 
rising food prices have not been sufficient to 
strengthen the people’s purchasing power. 
Consumer food subsidies in Egypt are poorly 
targeted so that, according to the World Bank 
(2007), between one-quarter and one-third of the 
poor do not benefit from them. Moreover, real 
wages in both the public and private sector have 
continued to decrease over the last decade (Abdel-
hamid and el-Baradei, 2009).18 This means that 
wages of many Egyptians are inadequate due to the 
rising prices and cannot help sustain a decent 
 
17 See Abdelhamid and el-Baradei (2009); Wael Gamal, 
“Remembering the poor?,” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 7-13, 2005, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/750/ec1.htm; Mona el-Fiqi, 
“Not Even Minimum Wage,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-30 July 
2008, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/907/ec1.htm. 
18 Although, in another study by Mona Said (2007), a different 
trend is found, namely that in 2006, real wages actually recov-
ered almost to their 1988 level, this improvement only 
happened from 1998 to 2000 (see UNDP, 2008). This, 
therefore, confirms the trend of decreasing real wages over the 
last decade. 
quality of life.19 The increase in wages and in the 
annual social bonuses endorsed by the government 
were only directed toward the public sector 
workers, thus excluding informal sector workers. 
Yet, even for a majority of public sector workers, 
who are the target of the government’s measures, 
salary increases have failed to keep pace with the 
rising inflation.20 The unprecedented increase in the 
number of protests and labor strikes since mid-2004 
reflects the growing dissatisfaction, especially 
among public sector employees, due to low wages 
and delays in payment of bonuses (Beinin, 2008). 
The recent and still ongoing debate on a minimum 
wage level is emblematic of the huge gap between 
the government’s proposals and public employees’ 
demands. For example, while in November 2010 the 
National Wage Council21 raised the legal minimum 
 
19 Author’s interviews in Cairo, October 2010; “Workers, not 
voters, worry Egypt’s government,” Al-Masry al-Youm, 
November 23, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/workers-not-voters-
worry-egypts-government; Mona el-Fiqi, “Not Even 
Minimum Wage,” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 20-30, 2008, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/907/ec1.htm. 
20 In addition to the sources quoted above, see also Noha el-
Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt’s and Independent 
Union,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, July 20, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/school-teachers-
form-egypts-2nd-independent-union; “Education Ministry 
employees continue sit-in,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, June 27, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/education-ministry-
employees-continue-sit. 
21 It was established by the government in 2003, with the 
mandate to ensure that salaries (for the government, 
nongovernment and private sectors) should be on a par with 
the cost of living. 
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wage to LE400 per month, teachers demanded a 
minimum wage of at least LE1200.22 
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22 Mohamed Azouz, “Investors’ federation calls for upping 
minimum wage to LE600/month,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
November 2, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/investors-federa-
tion-calls-upping-minimum-wage-le600month; Noha el-
Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt’s and Independent 
Union,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, July 20, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/school-teachers-
form-egypts-2nd-independent-union. 
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In spite of robust economic growth, labor market 
challenges in Egypt have exacerbated in the last 
decade. Although, unlike to the 1988–98 period, 
unemployment in Egypt decreased from 1998 to 
2006 (from 11.7 percent to 8.3 percent), this was 
associated with a deterioration in job quality 
(Assad, 2007). Continuing a trend already noticed 
in the 1990s, the majority of jobs created in the 
1998–2006 period were in the informal economy, 
where workers are paid low wages, lack social 
security coverage, are hired without work contracts, 
and are therefore more exposed to the risk of 
poverty. As a result, informal employment 
increased from 57 percent in 1998 to 61 percent in 
2006 (Ivi). Moreover, the labor market scenario for 
the youth has experienced a dramatic deterioration. 
While, as mentioned above, total unemployment 
improved, unemployment among graduates 
increased from 9.7 percent to 14.4 percent (Ivi). 
Also informal employment expanded primarily 
among the young with an intermediate or university 
education, suggesting that the majority of youth 
who entered the labor market did not have a legal 
contract and were therefore paid very low wages 
and lacked social insurance coverage (Wahba, 2010; 
Assad, 2007). 
The global crisis has further exacerbated the labor 
market challenges in Egypt. In spite of the fiscal 
stimulus package announced by the government to 
cope with the crisis in early 2008 (Klau, 2010), 
employment growth has slowed down, lay-offs have 
increased, and the total unemployment rate has 
started to rise, albeit slightly (from 8.9 percent in 
2007 to 9.4 percent in 2009).23 These pressures on 
the labor market are likely to lead to a further 
increase in “informalization” (Radwan, 2009). The 
youth, again, appear to have been particularly 
affected by the global crisis.24 For example, between 
the last quarter of the year 2007 and the last quarter 
of 2008, as a result of the crisis, unemployment 
went up for the age groups 15-20 and 20-25 (Ivi). 
The above data clearly leads one to believe that the 
economic policies followed by the Egyptian 
government over the last decade have had a very 
limited impact on job creation. In spite of the acce-
leration of market-oriented reforms following the 
appointment of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif in 
2004, economic performance during this period 
continued to depend on a favorable external envi-
ronment, which was the engine of much of its 
growth (Achcar, 2009). The country’s economic 
boom during 2003–07 was largely due to the boom 
in the global oil market, which benefited Arab oil 
exporting countries and resulted in higher FDI and 
remittances from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries. With the global financial crisis and the 
consequent decline in the fortunes of GCC coun-
 
23 CBE (2010), CTUWS (2009), Abu Hatab (2009). See also 
“The War on Prices,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 26–April 1, 
2009, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/940/ec54.htm; “Hard 
times ahead,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 12-18, 2009, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/938/ec3.htm; “Acting to save 
jobs,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 24-30, 2009, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/ec1.htm. 
24 “Forget unemployment,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 26–
April 1, 2009, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/940/ec2.htm; 
“Acting to save jobs,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 24-30, 
2009, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/ec1.htm. 
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tries, Egypt’s economic growth slowed down with 
noticeable declines in the major drivers of its 
economic growth, namely exports, FDI, 
remittances, and tourism revenues (Paciello, 2010; 
Radwan, 2009; Abu Hatab, 2009). 
In spite of the attempts to improve Egypt’s 
competitiveness over the years, its export structure 
remained heavily dominated by natural resources 
and low-tech manufacturing exports, which provide 
very low quality jobs and limited opportunities to 
well-qualified young workers. In addition, FDI 
flowed to capital-intensive sectors that do not 
generate sufficient employment opportunities. The 
large increases in FDI in recent years reflects 
privatization rather than new investment 
opportunities that could have contributed to job 
creation (Alissa, 2007; El-Megharbel, 2007; ENCC, 
2008). Yet, economic reforms did not bring about 
an increase in private investment as initially 
expected. Thus, while the prospects of public sector 
employment declined significantly due to 
government’s measures aimed at reducing the 
budget deficit (Wahba, 2010), employment 
opportunities in the formal private sector remained 
limited (UNDP, 2010).  
Although the government has launched numerous 
programs to address labor market problems over 
the last decade, it has lacked a comprehensive labor 
market strategy, because it has dealt with 
employment problems via piecemeal and scattered 
measures, and has made no attempt to link macro-
economic choices to job creation (El-Megharbel, 
2007; Wahba, 2010; author’s interviews conducted 
in Cairo on November 2010). Last, with the retreat 
of the state as a welfare provider, in the wake of the 
market-oriented reform initiative, the quality of 
public education, particularly higher education, has 
significantly deteriorated. This has contributed to 
creating a supply of unskilled, unqualified partly-
educated graduates, who are not necessarily in 
demand in the labor market (see below).  
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Over the last two decades, the social welfare system 
in Egypt has been through a serious crisis.25 
Although in the 1990s social expenditure was 
relatively protected, nonetheless, this was not suffi-
cient to prevent a deterioration in the quality of 
health and education services. Social spending 
remained too low to compensate for increasing 
population growth and too much of it went into 
paying the salaries of a large number of public 
employees. As a result, although health care and 
education are free, private expenditure on those 
services is on the increase, in particular for the poor.  
Over the last decade, the reduction of state welfare 
measures appears to be on the increase. Public 
expenditure on social services has been cut.26 Public 
spending on education has declined, from 19.5 
percent in 2002 to 11.5 percent in 2006, as a 
percentage of total expenditure, and from 5.2 
percent to 4.0 percent, as a percentage of GDP 
(UNDP, 2008). In particular, public funding for 
university education has suffered a significant 
reduction in recent years.27 Similarly, although total 
health expenditure as a percentage of public 
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25 See Galal (2003), UNDP (1998), Bayat (2006), Paciello 
(2007), Tadros (2007), Harrigan and el-Said (2009). 
26 Between 2002 and 2006, the increase in total social spending 
(from 15 percent to 25 percent of government expenditure 
and from 4.5 percent to 7.6 percent of GDP) mostly reflects 
the expansion of the food subsidy system. 
27 See for example Abul Soud Mohamed and Mohamed 
Kamel, “University teachers criticize reduced funding for 
education and research,” Al-Masry al-Youm, April 19, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/university-teachers-
criticize-reduced-funding-education-and-research; Fahim and 
Sami, 2009. 
spending increased from 1.2 percent in 2001–02 to 
3.6 percent in 2008–09, its share has remained low 
relative to other countries with comparable 
incomes. Most of it goes to pay salaries, although 
these are insufficient to guarantee a dignified life for 
the health sector workers (EIPR, 2009a; 2009b). 
Considering that the Egyptian population increased 
over the years, public health expenditure per person 
actually declined in the last decade.28 The financial 
crisis has worsened the problem of low public 
funding to social services, with cuts in public health 
expenditure observed for the year 2009–10 
compared to the previous one.29  
The quality of education and healthcare provisions 
have continued to deteriorate severely,30 while 
 
28 Author’s Interviews in Cairo, November 2010. 
29 Doha Abdelhamid, “Mind the gap,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 
14-20, 2009, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/947/ec1.htm. 
30 For education, see UNDP (2010); “Poor education squeezes 
Egypt’s growth,” Al-Masry al-Youm, October 6, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/poor-education-
squeezes-egypt’s-growth; Tareq Salah, “Muslim Brotherhood: 
Nazif government unable to develop country,” Al-Masry al-
Youm, October 25, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/muslim-brother-
hood-nazif-government-unable-develop-country; 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/school-teachers-
form-egypts-2nd-independent-union; Noha el-Hennawy, 
“School teachers form Egypt’s 2nd independent union,” Al-
Masry al-Youm, July 20, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/fixing-egypt’s-
schools-we-need-compete; For public university, Mohamed 
el-Sayed, “Educated guess,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 31, 
2009-January 6, 2010, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/979/sc111.htm; Shaden 
Shehab, “Empty change,” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 22-28, 2010, 
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families incur a wide range of private costs when 
they access public social services. For example, a 
majority of families are still forced to spend a large 
portion of their monthly budget on private tuition, 
despite the official schooling.31 In 2008–09 these 
families’ expenditure on private lessons accounted 
for LE13 billion, which is one-third of the budget 
allocated to education by the state.32 Similarly, 
private out-of-pocket health spending has increased 
faster than public spending, from 63 percent of total 
health expenditure in 2002 to 70 percent in 2008 
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http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1008/eg5.htm; Mohamed 
Aboulghar, “Egyptian educational decline: is there a way 
out?,” Al-Ahram Weekly, February 2-8, 2006, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/780/sc7.htm. For the health 
system, Sabry (2009); Mohamed Abdel Khaleq Mesahel, 
“Egyptian doctors demand better conditions,” Al-Masry al-
Youm, April 9, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/egyptian-doctors-
demand-better-conditions; “Protests erupt against poor 
medical coverage,” Al-Masry al-Youm, February 2, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/protests-erupt-
against-poor-medical-coverage. 
31 In 2004, the number of families stating that their children 
use private tutoring was between 61 and 70 percent of all 
students, but we were unable to find data after 2004 (Noha el-
Hennawy, “School teachers form Egypt’s 2nd independent 
union,” Al-Masry al-Youm, July 20, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/fixing-egypt’s-
schools-we-need-compete. See also Gamal Essam El-Din, 
“Education ministers face down critics,” Al-Ahram Weekly, 
December 20-30, 2009, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/978/eg3.htm. 
32 Rania Al Malky, “Editorial: Egypt’s online teenyboppers 
expose education fiasco,” Daily News, August 29, 2008, 
http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=16100. 
(EIPR, 2009a). Yet, the health insurance system 
remains highly unequal, with 46 percent of the 
population, including the unemployed and workers 
in the informal economy having no health 
insurance coverage, according to the most recent 
data (EIPR, 2009b; UNDP, 2008).33  
While reducing the resources devoted to education 
and health, in recent years, the Egyptian govern-
ment has made explicit attempts toward the 
privatization of social services. Since 2007, with the 
aim of privatizing the public health system, the 
government has drafted several health insurance 
bills34 that have led to protests, although no 
comprehensive reform has so far been introduced.35 
While there is no doubt that the health system is 
inequitable and needs a serious reform, the 
privatization of the health insurance system, as 
proposed by the government, could further 
disadvantage many people. It is unclear who among 
those who could not afford to pay for a private 
health insurance would have benefited from the 
 
33 On the revitalization of religious charity as a means to 
compensate for deteriorating public welfare, see Daniela 
Pioppi’s paper in this report. 
34 In 2007, through the prime minister’s decree number 637, 
the government announced the creation of the Egyptian 
Holding Company for Healthcare. All assets of the public 
health system were to be transferred to this commercial 
organization to be run on a for-profit basis. In 2008, the 
Egyptian Administrative court suspended the decree for being 
unconstitutional in terms of the right to health, and, one year 
later, on October 2009, a new medical insurance draft law was 
prepared by the government. 
35 On the government attempts at privatizing social-services, 
see also Daniela Pioppi’s paper in this report. 
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support of the state and how the state coverage 
would have been financed, given the lack of funds.36 
In fact, while the government attempted to reassure 
its opponents that the proposed health insurance 
law would have an enhanced coverage for all, on 
April 2010, the discussion on the new medical 
insurance bill in Parliament was postponed due to 
lack of funds, reflecting the repercussions of the 
global financial crisis on the Egyptian economy.37 
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36 See Mahmoud Gaweesh, “Pensioners, politicians protest 
new health insurance bill,” Al-Masry al-Youm, December 6, 
2009, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/pensioners-
politicians-protest-new-health-insurance-bill-0; EIPR (2009b); 
Jano Charbel, “Health care… for some?,” Al-Masry al-Youm, 
December 9, 2009, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/health-care…-
some. 
37 Mohsen Abdel Razeq, “Med insurance bill delayed for lack 
of funds,” Al-Masry al-Youm, April 15, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/news/med-insurance-bill-
delayed-lack-funds. 
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Over the last decade, Egypt has proceeded faster in 
promoting market-oriented reforms and it has 
registered significant economic success, according 
to international agencies. However, as shown above, 
this has been insufficient to address Egypt’s main 
socio-economic problems, as these policies have 
failed to diversify Egypt’s productive structure and 
to redistribute the benefits of economic growth to 
its population. Its macro-economic performance 
has been accompanied by a dramatic worsening in 
the living standards of most Egyptians. Combined 
with the deteriorating socio-economic conditions, 
the intensification of political repression and the 
lack of political voice has led to a sense of exaspera-
tion, particularly among the youth. In the absence 
of a large organized opposition or formal channels 
of political expression, people’s anger and frustra-
tion against the regime coalesced into spontaneous 
street protests, which finally forced Mubarak to 
quit. 
The economic and social problems described above 
were fundamentally rooted in the authoritarian 
nature of the regime. The capacity of the economy 
to deliver  balanced development and create suffi-
cient jobs has been severely hindered by 
authoritarianism, which has perpetuated economic 
inefficiencies and discouraged the emergence of an 
independent and competitive private sector. In fact, 
economic reforms were used by the Mubarak 
regime to redistribute privileges to its intimate 
associates and co-opt key segments of the business 
sector, thus allowing it to expand its social basis and 
consolidate authoritarianism (Alissa, 2007; Beinin, 
2009; Wurzel, 2004, 2009; Heydemann, 2007; 
Richter, 2007). This, among others, prevented the 
emergence of an autonomous and competitive 
private sector, which is an essential pre-condition 
for any genuine and inclusive economic reform. It 
also led to widespread corruption and encouraged 
the concentration of wealth in fewer hands. 
Moreover, under Mubarak, opposition forces, small 
to medium businessmen and trade unions were very 
weak and unable to influence decision-making, 
particularly in socio-economic matters (Alissa, 
2007; al-Din Arafat, 2009). This was because 
political parties and other civil society groups were 
harassed or co-opted by the regime, while the 
parliament was deprived of any authority. Also 
owing to their limited influence on decision-making 
in the parliament, political parties had no interest in 
developing a clear and well-structured economic 
and social platform, to counteract the regime’s 
agenda.38  
The departure of Mubarak is an important step 
towards political change and, given that the 
country’s socio-economic failures mostly stem from 
the authoritarian nature of his regime, the changing 
political context could offer an opportunity to 
implement a more effective and inclusive economic 
agenda. Having said this, the fate of Egypt’s 
democratic transition continues to remain 
uncertain insofar as the old system of power 
continues to coexist along side the emerging new 
one, permeating all state institutions (e.g., security, 
administration, media, justice and so on) (Paciello, 
2011). The Military Council, which took over the 
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38 Author’s interviews in Cairo, October 2010. The only 
political party having a clear platform with regard to socio-
economic issues appeared to be Tagammu’ party. On the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s social agenda see Daniela Pioppi’s 
paper in this report. 
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interim rule of Egypt after Mubarak stepped down, 
has made no effort so far to discard the previous 
system of power, thereby giving credibility to the 
belief that the military was an integral component 
of the previous regime. Only very limited and hesi-
tant political concessions have been made to the 
revolution, and this early phase of transition has 
been managed with a top-down approach (Ivi).  
Egypt’s economy now faces a double challenge: 
coping with the negative effects of the current 
economic crisis resulting from the political 
upheaval39 and addressing the structural socio-
economic problems that were inherited by the 
Mubarak regime and had contributed to its fall. 
Growth projections for 2011 have been revised from 
5 percent to 3 percent,40 while the employment 
downside of the current economic crisis is likely to 
be dramatic, considering the fact that the tourism 
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39 For a brief account, see the following articles: “Revolution 
cost tourism, real estate, industry sectors over LE10 billion,” 
Al-Masry al-Youm, February 17, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321811. “Reopening 
of Egypt’s stock exchange may be postponed for third time,” 
Al-Masry al-Youm, March 4, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/338787. Salma El-
Wardani, “Market report: Egypt’s stocks end week lower as 
market eyes corruption cases,” Ahram online, April 7, 2011, 
www.english.ahram.org.eg. Mohamed El Dahshan “The 
economic revolution is yet to happen,” Al-Masry al-Youm, 
March 5, 2011 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/340023. For a 
review of main-socio-economic challenges, also see Paciello 
(2011). 
40 Mohamed El Dahshan “The economic revolution is yet to 
happen,” Al-Masry al-Youm, March 5, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/340023. 
industry — which employs more than 2.5 million 
Egyptians,41 and which saw all tour reservations for 
February cancelled — has still not recovered from 
the impact. The dramatic events in Libya have also 
magnified Egypt’s economic troubles, owing to the 
loss of remittances and the flood of thousands of 
returnees who will add to the pressures on the labor 
market. As a result of the difficult economic 
situation, workers’ strikes and labor protests have 
been ongoing,42 despite the military council having 
approved a draft law that punishes anyone 
organizing, inciting, or participating in protests that 
damage the economy with imprisonment or/and 
paying of a fine43 and despite the growing use of 
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41 Early estimates say that tourist facilities dismissed tempo-
rary staff and decreased salaries for permanent workers for a 
total loss in income of LE70 million, (“Revolution cost 
tourism, real estate, industry sectors over LE10 billion,” Al-
Masry al-Youm, February 17, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/321811. 
42 See “Labor protests continue in Cairo and other governo-
rates,” Al-Masry al-Youm, April 12, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/397535; “Egypt’s 
army should bring opposition to manage workforce’s expecta-
tions, say experts,” Al-Masry al-Youm, February 20, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/324523; “Thursday’s 
papers: Interim constitution and shake-up of state media,” Al-
Masry al-Youm, March 31, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/381350. 
43 See “Labor protests continue in Cairo and other governo-
rates,” Al-Masry al-Youm, April 12, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/397535; “The 3rd 
meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers,” March 23, 2011, 
http://cabinet.gov.eg/Media/NewsDetails.aspx?id=2260; 
“Egypt’s army should bring opposition to manage workforce’s 
expectations, say experts,” Al-Masry al-Youm, February 20, 
2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/324523; 
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force and arrests of protesters by the army (Paciello, 
2011). 
Egypt needs to radically revise its economic and 
social reform agenda: prioritizing structural reforms 
that diversify its productive structure; 
mainstreaming a “youth perspective” in its 
economic and social strategies. This means, among 
others, implementing economic policies that expli-
citly target job creation for the young or assessing 
the specific impact of economic reforms on youth; 
making the social welfare system more inclusive 
and progressive; and coping with the problem of 
high food inflation through policies that raise agri-
cultural productivity. Unless the social and 
economic policies are reoriented toward a more 
redistributive and youth-centered agenda, the 
socio-economic deterioration is expected to 
continue.  
Coping with Egypt’s main socio-economic chal-
lenges requires, above all, a profound restructuring 
of its political economy so as to deal with wide-
spread corruption. A new independent business 
sector also needs to be formed. Even though a deep 
reconfiguration of the country’s political economy 
will take a long time, it will very much depend on 
whether and how political transition takes place. If 
the political transition takes the direction of an 
authoritarian involution or an unfinished political 
transformation, which keeps the old system of 
power intact, the country is unlikely to succeed in 
addressing its main long-term socio-economic 
challenges. Indeed, a political transition backed by 
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“Thursday’s papers: Interim constitution and shake-up of state 
media,” Al-Masry al-Youm, March 31, 2011, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/381350. 
regime loyalists or forces linked to the previous 
regime, such as the military, will not lead to tackling 
crony capitalism and/or the pervasive corruption. 
In this regard, the composition of the upcoming 
parliament will be important in influencing the 
trajectory of Egypt’s political transition and its 
future economic policies. If, as expected, parlia-
mentary elections are held in September 2011, 
followed by presidential elections at the end of the 
year, most political forces, especially those that 
emerged during the protests, are unlikely to 
organize and mobilize support given the tight 
timeframe and their lack of internal cohesion. As a 
result, the next parliament is likely to include only a 
narrow spectrum of political forces, namely the 
Muslim Brothers and regime loyalists. Egypt’s 
future economic agenda might therefore be drafted 
by a restricted group in line with its specific inter-
ests, which is likely to opt for support to the status 
quo. Unless a broad consensus is reached on the 
social and economic agenda to be pursued in the 
coming years, and a more active involvement of 
civil society groups in decision-making is allowed, 
there will be no hope for genuine and effective 
economic and social reforms. In the absence of 
adequate policies that ease the crisis and respond to 
Egypt’s structural socio-economic problems, 
popular discontent, particularly among the young, 
is expected to mount.  
Fiscal problems may curb the capacity of current 
and future Egyptian governments to seriously cope 
with the country’s socio-economic challenges. 
Despite some improvements in the last decade, 
Egypt suffers from a high budget deficit and large 
public debt ratios, which have worsened as a result 
TRANSITION TO WHAT: EGYPT’S UNCERTAIN DEPARTURE 
FROM NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM  
23 


of the global crisis.44 The current economic crisis 
has further aggravated fiscal problems as govern-
ment revenues have dropped owing to the collapse 
in tourism and foreign investment. Due to its weak 
fiscal position, the new government may not be in 
the financial position to meet workers’ demands. 
For example, raising the minimum wage to 
acceptable levels, as demanded by public sector 
employees, would require the government to find 
extraordinary funds to cover the budget deficit. 
Labor protests could also become more forceful and 
vocal, and social tensions could also re-emerge with 
more force.  
Egypt may be able to partially cope with these 
problems by taking recourse to external aid, but this 
will imply that it will have limited leverage in 
shaping its own economic policies. For example, 
under a possible intervention by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Egypt would 
be forced to restrain its expansionary policies, by 
cutting public expenditure, eliminating food subsi-
dies, privatizing the health insurance system, and 
withdrawing the wage bill. If implemented, these 
measures could further damage Egypt’s socio-
economic conditions and provoke strong 
opposition from the population.  
In a scenario as described above, the EU and the 
United States will need to fundamentally rethink 
their policies vis-à-vis Egypt, keeping in view that 
political and economic reforms have to be pursued 
jointly in order to sustain Egypt’s transition to a 
democratic system. To contain the risk of an autho-
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44 As a result of the stimulus package adopted to face the 
global crisis, the deficit to GDP ratio further increased from 
6.8 percent in 2008 to 8.4 percent in 2009 (ENCC, 2008).  
ritarian involution, the EU and the United States 
should unequivocally condemn the interim and 
future authorities in case of violations of human 
rights or evidence of political regression. Also, the 
EU and the United States should engage in discus-
sions with the broad spectrum of existing political 
and social actors in the country, from new trade 
unions to moderate Islamist parties, and consult 
them to detail the policies for political transition, 
including the economic measures to be taken. With 
regard to economic cooperation, the EU and the 
United States themselves are called upon to 
fundamentally revise their policies toward Egypt, by 
prioritizing job creation and introducing a youth 
perspective in the economic reforms supported by 
them. With a view to reconfiguring the equilibrium 
of the country’s political economy and favoring the 
emergence of a new private sector, there is also need 
to establish adequate mechanisms to monitor those 
who benefit from foreign financial assistance, in 
order to ensure that these resources are not 
channeled to businessmen tied to the previous 
regime (Cassarino and Tocci, 2011). 
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On January 28, 2011, many Egyptian cities saw the 
biggest uprising in the country’s history. Inspired by 
the toppling of Tunisian President Zine al-Abideen 
Ben Ali on January 14, Egyptians fought the 
ministry of interior’s security forces, who used 
rubber bullets, pellet guns, tear gas, and at times live 
ammunition to attempt to control the protesters. By 
late afternoon, it was clear that the state was losing 
the battle. Across the country, protestors set fire to 
police stations and to the offices of the National 
Democratic Party (NDP), the two most prominent 
symbols of the nexus of power between an authori-
tarian state and a corrupt political elite — the 
institutions through which the Mubarak regime had 
imposed its matrix of control. 
By the evening of that momentous day in central 
Cairo, protesters had taken control of Tahrir 
Square. On its northern edge, facing the River Nile 
was the imposing headquarters of the NDP, an ugly 
1970s structure that overshadowed the pretty Italia-
nate building of the Egyptian Museum that stood 
next to it. Around midnight, with street fighting still 
raging, protesters began to loot the NDP building. A 
group stopped cars on the Nile Corniche to siphon 
off their fuel. For the next three days, the building 
burned, while piles of office equipment taken from 
the building were stacked next to the Egyptian 
Museum, with a citizens’ watch guarding it, 
insisting that it belonged to the people and must be 
returned to them. 
Over the following 13 days, the entire first rung of 
the party’s leadership disappeared from public view 
and a new secretary-general, Hossam Badrawy — a 
polished businessman who had been close to Gamal 
Mubarak — was appointed. But, after a last-ditch 
attempt at rescuing the regime, Badrawy resigned 
on February 11 only a few hours before it was 
announced that President Hosni Mubarak was no 
longer president and the military was assuming 
power. A caretaker administration made up of mid-
ranking party leaders then assumed power, led by 
Muhammad Ragab, an organizational boss less 
tainted by his association with the presidential 
family.  
Finally, on April 16, the Supreme Administrative 
Court ruled that the party should be dissolved. 
However, caught up in the debate on what to do 
with the NDP, one loses sight of the need for an 
accountability from the NDP on its role in 
maintaining the Mubarak regime, its close relation-
ship with the state’s repressive apparatus, and its use 
of the state as an instrument to implement a here-
ditary succession scheme that served to preserve the 
interests of multiple elements within the regime by 
proposing Gamal Mubarak’s name to replace his 
father. This is symptomatic of the lack of interest 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces — which 
is ruling Egypt in the interim period before a new 
parliament and president are elected — has in tran-
sitional justice. There has been no systematic 
attempt to understand how institutions like the 
state security, the presidency, or the NDP kept their 
hold on power and increasingly turned Egypt into a 
mafia state.  
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The NDP played a part in the downfall of the 
Mubarak regime in at least three key respects. First, 
it came to be viewed as a vehicle for the rise of 
Gamal Mubarak. Second, it was perceived as being 
as hopelessly corrupt, as the location “where power 
meets money,” as the Egyptian analyst Emad Gad 
described it. Finally, its conduct in elections has 
gradually come to be seen as beyond the pale, with 
its candidates engaging in the last decade in obvious 
and flagrant fraud and vote-buying. 
The last poll the NDP participated in before the 
revolution is a case in point. In a two-round elec-
tion in late November and early December 2010, 
Egypt’s National Democratic Party won 84 percent 
of the seats in the People’s Assembly (Egypt’s lower 
house of parliament), with an additional 9 percent 
going to NDP members who stood as independent 
candidates. The conduct of the elections — which 
according to civil society observers were marred by 
widespread harassment of opposition candidates at 
the hands of the security services, ballot-stuffing, 
and other forms of electoral fraud — dumbfounded 
political commentators. Why did a party, whose 
political dominance was guaranteed, feel it neces-
sary to discredit its own claims to electoral honesty 
as well as belie the regime’s supposed commitment 
to gradual democratic reforms by staging such an 
obviously rigged election? 
After all, the NDP’s ability to legislate had not been 
hindered when it only controlled 73 percent of the 
seats in the previous parliament, even if the 
presence of a sizable opposition dominated by 
Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood had given it 
a few headaches. Nor did the regime’s pronounced 
desire to reduce the size of the Muslim Brothers’ 
parliamentary bloc explain the fierce competitive-
ness toward parties from the legal, secular 
opposition — which had expected to gain ground 
from the crackdown on the Brotherhood — or 
indeed within the NDP itself. For many analysts, the 
elections were either a mis-step of the security 
services who “over-rigged” ahead of a looming 
presidential transition, or a sign of zero tolerance 
for the boisterous opposition that has been present, 
formally and informally in Egyptian politics since 
2005.  
Another explanation, however, has to do with the 
changes in regime politics over the last decade and 
the opening of the NDP to new recruits after two 
decades of stagnation and unchanging leadership. 
Since it began its transformation in 2002 with the 
rise of Gamal Mubarak, President Hosni Mubarak’s 
second son, the NDP became a battleground for 
influence over government policy, for economic 
clout and access to the state apparatus. In the con-
text of a dispirited polity, and widespread voter 
disinterest in elections that are increasingly 
flagrantly rigged, as well as the deep uncertainty 
about the future of the regime once the president 
had been removed, the NDP became the vehicle of 
individual political ambitions and the main tool for 
legitimizing an eventual Gamal Mubarak presi-
dency. It became the backdoor for influencing 
government policy, long dominated by state tech-
nocrats, and an arena where disparate interests and 
clientelist networks vied for positions, ahead of an 
impending political transition. 
The question of what exactly the NDP stands for — 
its detractors frequently joke that it is neither 
national, nor democratic, nor even a real party — 
illustrates a long-standing dilemma of republican 
Egypt. The July 1952 Free Officers’ coup banned 
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political parties and then created a succession of 
single parties — the Liberation Rally and the Arab 
Socialist Union (ASU) — as it sought to manage 
politics and cultivate national elites beyond the 
military. When Egypt returned to multi-party poli-
tics under President Anwar al-Sadat in 1976, the 
regime had wanted a political landscape roughly 
divided between left, right, and center to represent 
the various strands of the ASU. Yet, only two years 
later — perhaps spurred by the 1977 bread riots and 
widespread discontent with his overtures to Israel 
— Sadat created the NDP as his own party, leading 
to a mass exodus from the other parties as politi-
cians sought to rally behind the president. Largely 
stagnant under the Mubarak era, with leadership 
positions held by the same small group for over two 
decades, the NDP was reinvigorated in the 2000s 
both as a political party with wider appeal and a 
major influence on government policy, notably in 
the economic realm.  
It also became the site of political and policy battles 
and a major actor in the fragmentation of the Egyp-
tian regime that has characterized the late Mubarak 
period, in tandem with elements of the state (the 
armed forces, the security services, the civil service 
bureaucracy) that have dominated Egypt for 60 long 
years. Yet the NDP was neither a single party 
centered around a charismatic leader like the ASU, 
nor a hegemonic party that renews state leadership 
like the Chinese Communist Party, nor a simple 
administrative party that acts as an extension of the 
state. Much of the party dynamism of the last 
decade was a result of its role as a vehicle for Gamal 
Mubarak and his supporters, and their ambition, to 
legitimize an “inheritance of power” scenario for the 
post-Hosni Mubarak era. 
 34 THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
 

Gamal Mubarak was formally anointed as a key 
member of the NDP in September 2002, during the 
eighth general congress of the party — the first such 
congress the NDP had held in a decade. Although 
he had joined the party in 1999, reportedly after 
considering the launch of a new political party 
based on his Future Generation NGO, he had 
played no role in the management of the party nor 
in its electoral campaigns till 2002. The transforma-
tion of the NDP over the 2000s was thus closely 
associated with him and his supporters, who drafted 
a project to revitalize the party and make it a force 
for reform — a project made potent, but also prob-
lematic, by the general perception that it was just 
another gambit for survival of the Mubarak presi-
dency.  
Until the People’s Assembly elections in 2000, it was 
clearly an old guard triumvirate of Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Agriculture Youssef Wali 
(at the time the NDP’s Secretary General), Minister 
of Information Safwat al-Sherif (Deputy Secretary-
General), and Minister for Parliamentary Affairs 
Kamal al-Shazli (also Deputy Secretary-General) 
who had run the campaign, backed by a party 
secretariat largely comprising loyalists, many of 
whom had held the same positions for a long 
period. All three men — alongside many other party 
and government officials — were products of the 
early 1960s, at a time when the Gamal Abdel Nasser 
regime had sought to recruit a new generation of 
political operatives to consolidate the regime 
brought in by the Free Officers’s 1952 coup. Aside 
from a military career, the best route to social and 
political advancement for ambitious young men at 
the time was to be selected as members of the 
Tanzim Tali’i, a vanguard group that successively 
became a major recruiting ground for both political 
managers of the al-Shazli mold and security officers. 
What had been created to provide future leadership 
for the Arab Socialist Union would eventually 
provide the NDP’s lasting leadership, which came to 
power with Hosni Mubarak and remained largely 
unchanged until the last decade of the 20th century. 
The NDP’s 2002 Congress was the platform for the 
launch of New Thinking (Fikr Gedid), the reform 
program led by Gamal to overhaul the internal 
structure of the party and transform it into a major 
policy machine. The first of these aims nominally 
sought to address some of the widely perceived 
problems that the NDP had in attracting new talent 
beyond local-level political bosses, and most notably 
in appealing to the wider Egyptian elite — 
particularly young professionals — generally little 
interested in politics. It also sought to overhaul the 
internal structure of the party to render it more 
democratic and representative.  
Some efforts had indeed in part started prior to the 
2002 Congress, such as the creation of an internal 
electoral college to select candidates for the 2001 
Shura Council elections. That move, spearheaded 
by party whip Kamal al-Shazli, sought to answer 
criticism stemming from the 2000 elections, when 
the NDP only won 38 percent of the seats, with the 
remainder of its 86 percent majority coming from 
dissident party members who had failed to win the 
official nomination and ran as independents (as we 
shall see below, the problem of “NDP indepen-
dents” would be a recurring one until the 2010 
elections, in which the party’s decision to allow for 
multiple official candidates in many electoral 
districts partly resolved the problem of NDP 
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dissenters.) The 2002 Congress, however, addressed 
a far wider range of issues than electoral perfor-
mance. Its first priority was a reorganization of the 
way in which the party was run, giving its internal 
institutions — notably the 33-member General 
Secretariat that runs its daily affairs — greater 
prominence. This “institutionalization” of the party, 
as stressed by Gamal Mubarak, had the advantage of 
changing the way the party had been run for 
decades, by a handful of now aging apparatchiks in 
power for decades. 
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A first move was the removal of Youssef Wali (party 
secretary-general since 1985) by kicking him 
upstairs to the largely honorific position of deputy 
chairman. Although Wali remained on the 12-
member Political Bureau (which had little executive 
power), he had control over the party and was to be 
removed from his position as agriculture minister 
in 2004, after 22 years in the post. Wali’s removal 
was accompanied by an indirect attack on him only 
weeks prior to the 2002 Congress: his underse-
cretary at the ministry of agriculture, Youssef Abdel 
Rahman, was arrested on corruption charges. 
Similarly, a few months earlier, Muhammad al-
Wakeel, the director of news at Egyptian national 
television — personally appointed by Safwat al-
Sherif — had been arrested for a procurement 
scandal, while a member of parliament known to be 
close to Kamal al-Shazli was arrested for loan fraud 
only a week before the Congress.  
If Wali was an early victim of Gamal’s rise in the 
NDP, the other two parts of the NDP’s “old guard” 
triumvirate survived longer, but were weakened. In 
the July 2004 cabinet shuffle that brought many of 
Gamal’s associates into the ministries, al-Shazli lost 
his portfolio as minister of parliamentary affairs 
(held since 1996) and al-Sherif lost the important 
portfolio of minister of information (which he had 
held since 1982). Al-Shazli remained an important 
party electoral strategist in the 2005 elections — his 
knowledge of Egypt’s local politics was widely said 
to be unparalleled, helped by the fact that he was, 
until his death in November 2010, one of the 
longest-serving parliamentarians in the world. He 
was first elected to the People’s Assembly in 1964. 
Even though he lost the key post of NDP secretary 
for organization (effectively, the party whip, held 
since the NDP’s creation in 1978) in February 2006, 
making way for a key Gamal acolyte, Ahmed Ezz,’ 
al-Shazli was still considered a powerful kingmaker 
in the 2010 People’s Assembly elections, with some 
candidates complaining of his “comeback” up to his 
unexpected death on the campaign trail in his 
fiefdom of Bagour in late November 2010.45  
At the end of 2010, al-Sherif — whose early career, 
rooted in the intelligence services, distinguished 
him from his colleagues — was the only “old guard” 
leader still in place, wielding considerable power 
both due to his position in the NDP and as 
president of the upper house of parliament, the 
Shura Council. The latter position allowed him to 
head the Political Parties Committee, the body that 
grants (or, more often, refuses) new parties their 
licenses and regulates partisan life, and the Higher 
Press Committee, which grants newspaper licenses. 
The erosion of the power of the “old guard” was to 
be a long process, and indeed after 2006 — once key 
Gamal acolytes were in place — it became more 
accurate to talk of a power-sharing arrangement 
within a fragmented party rather than all-out rivalry 
between old and new guards. Indeed, al-Sherif 
maneuvered himself into being seen as an 
enthusiastic supporter of party reform. He was 
reported to have told party members in 2007 that 
“the party is still riddled with senior officials who 
resist change and contrive to occupy their positions 
for life.”46 
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45 Author’s interview with NDP candidate, November 2010. 
46 Gamal Essam Eddin, “Full Steam Ahead,” Al Ahram Weekly, 
August 2, 2007, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/856/eg7.htm. 
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The case against an “old guard” in power for so long 
would have been relatively easy to make for Gamal 
Mubarak and his acolytes, but naturally met with 
resistance from many members of the party who 
owed their political careers to the Wali, al-Sherif, 
and al-Shazli political networks. The 2002 party 
Congress was also significant as it had launched the 
first review of the NDP’s internal bylaws and orga-
nizational structure in its history It introduced 
direct elections to the General Secretariat for the 
first time (previously members were appointed by 
the president) and paving the way for a multi-year 
recruitment drive to infuse an aging party with new 
blood. President Hosni Mubarak, addressing the 
Congress, gave his own imprimatur to an initiative 
spearheaded by Gamal, calling for a “new intellec-
tual and organization groundwork that will govern 
the party’s performance in the future.” Mubarak 
added: “For the first time since the rise of the NDP, 
you will discuss and endorse new formulas for the 
party’s basic principles and statues, thus making use 
of our past experience to give momentum to our 
future work.” This gradualist approach was 
marrying “experience” and “youth,” two keywords 
that would regularly crop up in party discourse. 
The 2002 restructuring would not be fully imple-
mented until five years later, by the time of the 
NDP’s ninth general congress in November 2007. 
Early moves were designed to shake off control of 
provincial NDP structures by long-established MPs, 
by banning elected officials from holding the post of 
governorate-level secretary-general, and gradually 
instituting local-level elections for governorate-level 
posts and then party-wide elections for national-
level posts. Previously, party candidates at all levels 
were appointed by the party leadership. In 2005, 
ahead of that year’s parliamentary elections, elec-
tions for district and governorate levels were also 
held to encourage better representation and a 
younger makeup for local-level NDP offices. The 
party also introduced specific rules to ensure that 
younger members would be represented at various 
levels of the party: the position of secretary for 
youth was reserved for someone under 40, while 
local districts were imposed a quota of at least two 
under-40-year-old members for the NDP’s local 
councils. 
For the architects of these reforms — most notably 
Gamal and a few key aides — these moves had a 
dual intent. On the one hand, they opened positions 
in the party that might have otherwise been 
monopolized by the long-serving apparatchiks 
whose loyalties were with the old guard, which had 
put them in these positions in the first place. 
Creating vacancies, therefore, allowed for fresh 
recruitment of a new (and generally younger) 
political class that would owe, at least partly, posi-
tions to the rising new guard, thus consolidating its 
hold on the party more generally. On the other 
hand, the stress on opening the party to youth was a 
genuine attempt to reinvigorate a party widely seen 
as sclerotic. This dovetailed into the signature 
theme of the NDP since 2002 — increasing youth 
involvement in politics — a theme now closely 
associated with Gamal Mubarak, who in 2008 began 
to hold regular televised Q&A sessions with young 
Egyptians under the name Sharek (Participate), but 
that naturally has been echoed by opposition politi-
cians (notably al-Ghad party founder Ayman Nour) 
in a country where at least 50 percent of the popu-
lation is under 35. On the other hand, this 
“makeover” of the party’s image also helped in 
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recruiting professionals whose competence would 
be needed to carry out some of the technocratic 
ideas of the new guard.  
As such, the 2002–06 period saw a number of 
prominent Egyptian businessmen, intellectuals, and 
politicians — as well as many lesser-known perso-
nalities from think-tanks, international institutions, 
academia and the private sector — join the Policies 
Committee created in 2002 and headed by Gamal 
Mubarak. At one point, when it had over 300 
members, the Policies Committee was presented as 
an answer to the lack of intellectual credibility of the 
NDP as well as an effort to renew the party’s ties to 
the wider political elite. This was in part in response 
to the economic crisis and political paralysis that 
struck Egypt between 1999 and 2003, a time during 
which attempts to maintain the Egyptian pound’s 
value against the dollar led to the creation of a large 
currency black market while the banking system 
was struck with a liquidity crisis that made it 
virtually impossible to obtain credit. Debates in 
1999 and 2000 over the NDP’s relationship to this 
phenomenon, notably over the “loan deputies” 
scandal in which four NDP members were accused 
of having obtained loans from public banks without 
adequate collateral, had centered on cronyism in the 
party. But the government — and by extension, the 
NDP — under the cabinet of Prime Minister Atef 
Ebeid was known for its reluctance to implement 
reforms and its poor economic management. The 
economic crisis of 1999-2003 (by the end of which 
GDP growth was close to nil, unemployment was 
rising, and thousands of businesses were closing) 
brought to the fore both a real problem to solve and 
an opportunity for pro-market individuals in 
politics and business to gain a foothold in the NDP 
through Gamal. 
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The Policies Committee recruited extensively, 
leading many of its new members to hope that it 
could provide a new avenue to influence 
government policy. Some were disappointed early: 
the political scientist Osama al-Ghazali Harb, for 
instance, would abandon the NDP by 2006, 
complaining that Gamal was not interested in 
genuine political reform. He would go on to found 
his own party, the Democratic Front.47 Another 
liberal political scientist, Hala Mustafa, also 
expressed disappointment with the manner in 
which the Policies Committee was run, notably 
what she described as a “takeover” of the body by 
security services.48 Even among individuals chiefly 
interested in promoting economic reforms, the 
domination by a few personalities of the Policies 
Committee was frustrating: a World Bank econo-
mist who had joined the Policies Committee in 2004 
reported that, by 2006, efforts to institute new poli-
cies to address the crisis of Egypt’s banking sector 
were blocked by prominent businessmen who had 
been among the main beneficiaries of loose lending 
policies in the 1990s and continued to be under 
considerable debt to failed public banks such as 
Banque du Caire.49 Indeed, for some businessmen, 
joining the Policies Committee and investing in the 
development of the NDP (notably through financial 
largesse) may have been an insurance against 
repaying (or rescheduling) bad loans to public 
sector banks — while businessmen affiliated with 
the opposition received the reverse treatment. 
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47 Interview with the author, January 2008. 
48 Interview with the author, February 2009. 
49 Interview with the author, March 2006. 
The creation of the Policies Committee and the 
shake-up within the NDP’s internal structure 
allowed a new group of business people and 
advocates of neo-liberal policies to gain influence 
on government policy, by drawing on the resources 
and influence of business groups such as the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt 
(AmCham Egypt), a long-time leading advocate of 
market reforms.50 Taher Helmi, AmCham Egypt’s 
president in the mid-2000s, for instance, was a 
leading member of the NDP’s Economic Affairs 
committee who brought his experience as a 
corporate lawyer and his advocacy for a flat tax rate 
system to the NDP, influencing the slashing of 
corporate and income tax to a flat 20 percent in 
2004. Helmi also co-wrote a competition law passed 
in 2005, whose impact on the business of NDP whip 
and secretary for organization, Ahmed Ezz — who 
controls nearly 70 percent of Egypt’s steel produc-
tion — would be limited. An economic think-tank 
partly funded by Helmi and Gamal Mubarak, the 
Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, also influ-
enced policy formation.51 Mahmoud Mohieldin, a 
professor of finance from a prominent family, 
headed the NDP’s Economic Affairs committee — 
often using his position as a pulpit from which to 
criticize the policies of the Atef Ebeid government 
and advocate market reforms — until he was 
appointed minister of investment in 2004.  
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50 For an appraisal of the socio-economic effects of neo-liberal 
reform in Egypt see M. Cristina Paciello’s paper in this report. 
51 For a wider range of the economic policy influence on the 
NDP and Egyptian government see B. Rutherford (2008), 
Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the 
Arab World, Princeton University Press (Princeton). 
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Another former AmCham Egypt president, 
Muhammad Mansour, would become minister of 
transport in 2005, as would other businessmen, 
notably tourism mogul Ahmad Maghrabi 
(appointed in 2004 as minister of transport and 
later minister of housing) and former Unilever 
Egypt CEO Rachid Mohamed Rachid (who became 
minister of trade and industry in 2004). The 
families of Mansour and Maghrabi, who are related, 
co-own an investment fund with important stakes 
in leading residential development companies, and 
were thus in an ideal position to benefit from the 
increased sale of state land that took place after 
2004, in part fuelling a real estate boom.  
Another real estate tycoon alleged to have benefited 
from the NDP’s opening to business leaders is 
Hisham Talaat Mustafa, a prominent Policies 
Committee member who owns the Medinaty luxury 
housing development near Cairo and who was 
convicted of the murder of Lebanese pop diva Susan 
Tamim in 2010. The Mustafa family retains close 
ties to the NDP — Hisham Talaat Mustafa’s brother 
Tarek was a successful candidate in the 2010 
People’s Assembly elections in Alexandria, and 
became head of the housing committee in the new 
parliament. According to a dissident NDP member 
from Alexandria who was not selected as the party’s 
official candidate in the 2010 elections, real estate 
dealings benefitting from the five-year speculative 
real estate bubble are a major attraction for an 
aspiring MP, with membership of parliament 
granting preferential access to public administration 
and early knowledge of available terrain.52 
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52 Interview with the author, November 2010. 
In addition to the domestic business community, 
the changes in the NDP after 2002 had also received 
backing from abroad. The United States, in 
particular, was excited to find a reform-minded 
leadership in the party, and — ahead of the July 
2004 cabinet change — engaged with party leaders 
including Gamal Mubarak. In a 2004 Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Egyptian government, in 
part negotiated through the NDP’s rising new 
guard, Washington guaranteed funding in exchange 
for the implementation of market reforms that had 
long been postponed by the Ebeid government. 
These would become the blueprint for the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif for its first 
two years. As a Bush administration official 
involved in the negotiations put it, “We had found 
allies within the Egyptian regime who wanted to 
implement what we wanted, against those in the 
regime who were resisting change.”53 At a time 
when the United States was growing increasingly 
frustrated with Egypt’s start-stop implementation of 
the Structural Adjustment Program signed in 1992, 
the NDP “reformists” became useful allies against 
that part of the regime that had opposed market 
reforms — and vice-versa. When Bush 
administration officials tried to extend their success 
in extracting economic reforms to the political 
arena, however, the NDP’s “reformists” were not so 
keen. 
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The NDP “reformists” had their own plan for 
political reform. In 2007, the NDP presented 
parliament with 34 amendments to the Egyptian 
constitution. Ignoring long-standing demands of 
the opposition — such as the abrogation of the 
Emergency Law in place since 1981, the cancellation 
of the Political Parties Committee, instituting term 
limits on the presidency, and an overhaul of the 
electoral legislation — it drove through the most 
significant change to the constitution in 36 years. In 
some cases, the amendments simply adjusted the 
constitution to the policies favored by the NDP, for 
instance removing all references to socialism. But 
for many observers, the amendments appeared to 
be tailor-made to engineer a legitimate election of 
Gamal Mubarak as president should his father step 
down or die in office.  
The amendment to Article 76 — which had already 
been amended in 2005 to allow for Egypt’s first 
contested presidential election that year — allowed 
any legal party that controls at least three percent of 
seats in both houses of parliament to nominate a 
candidate. This effectively ensured that the NDP 
will face an opponent from the “controlled 
opposition” in the next presidential election, but 
stronger opponents such as the Muslim Brothers or 
a prominent independent personality with support 
across the political spectrum would be barred from 
competing.  
Likewise, the amendment of Article 88 to remove 
judicial supervision from elections — an unusual 
but cherished Egyptian practice since the 1920s — 
was perceived as impeding potential judges from 
reporting on electoral fraud and thereby reducing 
the legitimacy of future polls. The endgame, in this 
thinking, was that reformist judges — who had 
rebelled against electoral fraud in 2005 and staged 
popular anti-regime protests in 2006 — must be 
sidelined in order to ensure that a future 
presidential election to bring Gamal Mubarak to 
power appeared legitimate and was not contested by 
anyone with any real moral or legal authority. As 
the 2010 Shura and People’s Assembly elections 
would show, the electoral commission meant to 
replace judicial supervision was deeply flawed, 
endorsing the election’s results despite widely 
publicized fraud. As a prominent human rights 
activist put it in the aftermath of the poll, “the 
biggest fraud in this election is the electoral 
commission itself.”54 
The constitutional amendments, passed by a 
national referendum in May, were followed by 
changes to NDP by-laws that completed the picture 
for a pseudo-legitimate election of Gamal Mubarak. 
Another change that came in 2007 was the election 
of its chairman, for the first time in the history of 
the party. Previously, the president of the republic 
had automatically been appointed party chairman. 
While Hosni Mubarak predictably ran unopposed 
for the post, this change in the regulations opened 
the way for the eventual election of a chairman, who 
in turn would be the logical choice as the party’s 
candidate in presidential elections. Regulations for 
the nomination of the party’s presidential candidate 
were also changed, with the party’s General Secreta-
riat and its Politburo being merged to create a 45-
member Supreme Council from which candidates 
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54 President of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, 
Hafez Abou Seada, speaking at a press conference of election 
monitors, December 2010. 
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could be drawn. The Supreme Council (see attached 
chart, p. 83), while still made up of “old guard” 
members who were notably present in the six-
person steering committee that ran much of the 
party’s affairs, was largely composed of individuals 
who owed their position to the internal reforms 
conducted by the “reformists” in the past decade. 
Under this scenario, the NDP would have nomi-
nated Gamal as its candidate in any presidential 
elections — which the ruling party would easily 
have won against leaders from the weak legal oppo-
sition — and thus Gamal would have been 
legitimately elected, a major asset against any 
domestic adventurism and a shield from any 
criticism over the succession process by Egypt’s 
Western allies. 
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The 2010 People’s Assembly elections, aside from 
demonstrating the hegemonic position of the NDP 
in parliament, also highlighted a perennial problem 
faced by the party over the last decade: too much 
internal competition and not enough discipline. In 
the 2000 and 2005 People’s Assembly elections, 
after all, the NDP had officially won less than half of 
the vote, with its majority made up by “NDP inde-
pendents” rejoining the fold. The result of the 2010 
election can be seen as the party leadership’s solu-
tion to this problem: by allowing  multiple official 
party candidates to run against each other in over 
40 districts, it had insured it would have a much 
smaller proportion of rebel candidates, and these 
would not have to be allowed back into the party. 
Competition for seats in Parliament — over 5,800 
candidates (mostly from the NDP, whether officially 
or as independents) vied for only 508 seats — also 
suggests that the party was seen as an effective 
vehicle for individual political careers and financial 
interests. Furthermore, this also suggests that the 
party’s membership beyond the General Secretariat 
may not have been particularly attached to a single 
potential presidential candidate and casts doubt on 
the idea that — at least beyond the General 
Secretariat — Gamal Mubarak had a particularly 
strong lobby in his favor.  
While an important transformation did take place 
within Egypt’s ruling party between 2000 and 2011, 
one fundamental problem was that it remained 
dominated by opportunists rather than apparat-
chiks and loyalists and was not particularly 
ideologically coherent. Parliamentary debate in 
recent years, after all, has seen NDP MPs argue 
vociferously against government policy, including 
party bigwigs such as presidential chief-of-staff 
Zakariya Azmi. It also has seen the NDP’s 
parliamentary group increasingly infiltrated by 
retired members of the security services. Like the 
Mubarak regime as a whole, the NDP was, on the 
eve of the January 25 revolution, post-ideological 
and fragmented, suggesting that any person hoping 
to use it as a vehicle to the presidency would have 
had to both indulge its members and do battle with 
them. Crucially, it was also hated by large parts of 
the population, as the looting and burning of NDP 
offices across the country on January 28 showed. 
Unlike its predecessor, the ASU, the NDP was ulti-
mately unable to fulfill its basic function as a ruling 
party: that of an intermediary for the ordinary citi-
zens. 
The NDP’s legitimacy as a political force is now in 
tatters. On April 16, the Supreme Administrative 
Court ruled that the party should be dissolved and 
its assets — a considerable amount of real estate and 
bank accounts — be seized by the state. Just a few 
days prior to this, the party began a makeover by 
drafting a former independent politician and a 
nephew of former president Anwar al-Sadat, Talaat 
al-Sadat, as head of the party. It also changed its 
name to the “New National Party.” Mohammed 
Ragab and Magdi Allam, mid-level party bosses 
who have turned into leaders of its remnant 
members (as most of its first-tier leaders are now in 
jail awaiting trial on charges of corruption or for 
organizing attacks on anti-Mubarak protesters in 
early February) had recruited Sadat for the 
makeover, and boasted that the New National Party 
would perform well in the parliamentary elections 
scheduled for September, because its members were 
well-implanted, particularly in the countryside, and 
it would compete on providing services rather than 
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ideology positioning, like the new parties emerging 
on Egypt’s political scene. 
What this inheritor of the NDP stand for remains 
unclear, but opposition forces, facing new parlia-
mentary elections, fear that the NDP’s networks 
present a serious counter-revolutionary challenge. 
Others are beginning to voice the opinion that the 
NDP’s national network of partisans and election 
strategists should be drafted into the new parties, 
making a distinction between the party’s leadership 
and its rank-and-file. This, they argue, would give 
the secular opposition the best chance of facing off 
the only other organized political force in the 
country, the Muslim Brothers.  
At the time of writing, the direction that Egypt’s 
military-led transition process is headed in remains 
uncertain. The military, particularly if it decides to 
back a specific presidential candidate, could try to 
create a new NDP-like party around which notables 
and apparatchiks will rally much like they did 
around al-Sadat in 1978. Or, a real democratic 
breakthrough could take place, in which case the 
political scene is likely to be fragmented for some 
time and dominated by shifting alliances. Electoral 
politics, hopefully less fraudulent, will then tend to 
be dominated by ideological issues in more urban 
areas, while the families and tribes that often domi-
nate rural politics will migrate from the now 
defunct NDP to whatever party they believe offers 
them the most. Such a development would 
represent not only the end of the NDP and its 
successor, but also the end of six decades of single 
party mode of political management in Egypt, and 
perhaps provide a chance for a stable form of 
political pluralism that eluded the country in the 
monarchy era. 
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It is common knowledge in Egypt that the Muslim 
Brotherhood (jama’a al-ikhwan al-muslimin) is — 
after its re-emergence on the political scene back in 
the 1970s — the main (if not the only) real, 
organized and mass-based opposition force in the 
country. Events in Egypt in January–February 2011 
have refocused attention on this issue. While the 
illegal status of the Brotherhood and Egypt’s autho-
ritarian setting have not allowed for accurate 
quantitative analyses in the past decades, the above 
assertion almost certainly holds true today. Yet, it 
probably tells more about the weakness of Egypt’s 
organized opposition in general than about the 
strength of the Brotherhood itself. 
This paper aims to evaluate, to the extent possible, 
the state of health of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
after 40 years of co-existence with the Egyptian 
authoritarian regime, which was long characterized 
by “deepening authoritarian rule masked by limited 
and reversible liberalization” and by “political 
demobilization enforced by varying degrees of 
naked coercion” (Beinin, 2009: 21). 
Has the Muslim Brotherhood represented a real 
alternative to the Mubarak regime? Or is it more 
correct to speak in terms of an almost “functional” 
opposition, tamed by recurring political repression 
and limited freedom of action? To what extent has 
the Muslim Brotherhood been able to shape or at 
least to influence the Egyptian political and social 
agenda, both in relation to the regime and to other 
opposition forces? What would possibly be the 
MB’s role in the post-Mubarak era? 
To answer these and similar questions, we will 
analyze the recent evolution (1990–March 2011) of 
this Islamist organization focusing on: 
1. The Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship to 
the regime and its role in Egypt’s “25th of 
January revolution” and its immediate 
aftermath.  
The MB has long been the main opposition force in 
Egypt, but it has generally maintained a moderate 
approach towards the political establishment. This 
“accommodating” strategy has, on one hand, 
allowed the Islamist organization to survive and 
even flourish in certain periods but, on the other, it 
has exposed it to accusations of undue compromise 
with the regime and lack of political initiative. The 
Brotherhood’s relationship to the regime becomes 
particularly relevant today in view of the transition 
set in motion in the country in January 2011.  
2.      The nature and extent of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s social program and activities.  
The Muslim Brotherhood is well known for its 
widespread and efficient social activities, which are 
considered to be the key to the Islamists’ success in 
popular mobilization, in contrast with the regime’s 
lack of legitimacy due to the unfulfilled promises of 
the post-independence social pact, let alone of the 
neo-liberal era. Today, increasing poverty and social 
inequalities are emerging as one of the most 
challenging issues of Egyptian politics and the MB 
may — at least in theory — be better placed than 
other political actors to capitalize on social discon-
tent. However, socio-economic conservatism, 
cyclical repression, and political stagnation seem to 
have also affected the Brotherhood’s social action 
and its ability to formulate a clear social project.  
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The traditional position of the Muslim Brotherhood 
towards the regime has always been one of no direct 
confrontation. Following the jama’a’s founding 
principles, the achievement of political power 
should be postponed until the time is ripe, that is to 
say until society has been truly Islamized and 
prepared for an Islamic government. The search for 
power would otherwise not lead to an Islamic state 
and could also negatively affect the internal func-
tioning of the organization and its public image. 
This general principle was briefly contested in the 
second half of the 1940s when the Egyptian liberal 
regime was coming to an end. However, it was 
reinforced again in the 1970s and 1980s. The “new” 
Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged from the 
ashes of Nasserism, kept a moderate and, at times, 
even compliant approach towards the regime, 
whose policies had never been questioned seriously 
until today. The regime conversely never allowed 
the Islamist organization to be legalized and 
periodically limited its political and social activities, 
but cleverly capitalized on the Brotherhood’s 
willingness to compromise and on its conservative 
social program, both to increase its own popular 
legitimacy, by allowing for some kind of mass 
opposition, and at the same time to marginalize 
secular opposition.  
In the first decade of his presidency (1981–90), 
Mubarak allowed the Brotherhood to flourish and 
reach what is probably the peak of the jama’a 
presence in society after the golden age of the 1930s 
and 1940s. The MB consolidated its presence in 
student organizations, participated in parliamentary 
elections in 1984 and 1987, and won elections in the 
main professional associations (doctors, scientists, 
engineers, lawyers, etc.) (al-Awadi, 2004; Wickham, 
2002). Also, as we will illustrate in more detail in the 
next section, it consolidated its social presence 
through the establishment of an efficient network of 
charities linked to private (ahly) mosques. 
It was in the early 1990s that the honeymoon with 
the regime ended, to be only partially and briefly re-
established between 2000 and 2005. By the mid-
1990s, the Brotherhood was effectively ousted, or at 
least its presence seriously limited in all significant 
professional syndicates and in Parliament and 
thousands of its members were imprisoned (Kienle, 
2001: 131-70). However, the MB was not completely 
erased from the political scene as happened during 
the Nasser years and it continued to perform its role 
of the main opposition force. The regime’s aim was, 
in fact, to reduce and keep the Brotherhood’s public 
space and political/social impact under control, not 
to get rid of it once and for all. 
This was the status of the Brotherhood when Egypt 
entered the decade of “Arab reformism,” initiated 
mainly due to U.S. pressure after 9/11 and 
facilitated by a sudden awakening of Arab public 
opinion in reaction to the deterioration of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2000 onwards) and to 
the Iraq war (2003). In Egypt, the reformist debate 
acted as a catalyst for the opposition’s mobilization 
on the issue of succession to the old and probably 
sick Hosni Mubarak.  
A first wave of mobilization took place in 2004–05, 
facilitated by presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions scheduled for 2005. In 2004, the opposition 
started, in an unprecedented move, to directly 
criticize the Mubarak family and ask for an end to 
the emergency law (in place since 1981), for proce-
dures for the legalization of political parties, and, 
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above all, for multi-candidate presidential elections, 
thus marking an important shift from the regime-
friendly demonstrations focusing on specific foreign 
policy issues (Palestine, Iraq) that took place in 
2002–03.  
The democratic reform euphoria also influenced the 
MB, which brought out a more explicit reformist 
political program in a document released in March 
2004.55 The Brothers actively participated in the 
many opposition demonstrations and events until 
the summer of 2005, often determining their 
success at least in terms of popular participation. 
However, the political initiative of that period was 
not in the hands of Islamists. Rather it was the game 
of new entries on the Egyptian political scene, such 
as the well-known Egyptian Movement for Change 
or the newly legalized Tomorrow Party (al-Ghad) of 
Ayman Nour, which managed to compensate for 
lack of a meaningful mass support with effective 
slogans and efficient media campaigns both domes-
tically and at the international level. The political 
slogan that hit the newspaper headlines at that time 
was not “Islam is the solution” or any other 
“ikhwani” mot d’ordre, but “kefaya!” (“Enough!”), 
the slogan by which the Egyptian Movement for 
Change came to be known in Egypt and abroad. 
Indeed, the Kefaya Manifesto became the common 
platform for the so-called intifada al-islah or the 
reform protest of all opposition forces.  
In February 2005, Mubarak reacted to the opposi-
tion’s requests by announcing the amendment of 
Article 76 of the Constitution, introducing presi-
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55 The Muslim Brotherhood Initiative for Reform, Declared in 
Syndicate of Journalists, March 3, 2004. For an Italian 
translation of the Arabic text, see Guazzone (2005: 407-421). 
dential multi-candidate elections for the first time 
in Egyptian history.56 The Muslim Brotherhood, 
together with other opposition forces, denounced 
the constitutional amendments as cosmetic and 
called for a boycott of the May referendum 
convened to approve the new norms (Arafat, 2009: 
173; El Amrani, 2005). Yet, they carefully skirted the 
issue of presidential elections to be held only a few 
months later in September 2005, publicly encour-
aging their members to vote as their consciences 
dictated, a move that has been interpreted as a not-
so-tacit support for Mubarak. A similar lack of 
coherence was demonstrated by other important 
opposition parties, such as the Wafd and al-Ghad, 
which filed their no-chance-to-win candidates for 
the presidential elections immediately after having 
boycotted the May referendum. 
Some observers argued that the Brotherhood’s 
success at the parliamentary elections later that year 
(the MB obtained 88 seats or 20 percent, a record 
not only for Islamists, but for the opposition in 
general) was the regime’s reward for not boycotting 
the presidential elections and, in fact, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had organized their electoral 
campaign in a particularly tolerant atmosphere that 
lasted till the first day of elections.57 Only after the 
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56 The amended Article 76 lays out two paths to presidential 
candidacy: the first through membership in a party, provided 
that the party has been in existence for at least five consecutive 
years and has at least 3 percent of the seats in parliament. The 
second is for “independents,” who must obtain the signatures 
of at least 250 elected officials from the parliament and 
municipal councils, which are completely controlled by the 
National Democratic Party. 
57 In 2000 and 2005, parliamentary elections were organized 
over a span of three weeks to allow for judicial supervision. 
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Islamists’ positive results in the first provinces that 
voted became clear did the regime unleash the 
repression machine, which became even harsher 
after the elections (El Amrani, 2005; ICG, 2008). 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success had 
probably gone too far.  
In the following years, the jama’a suffered from 
what has been labeled the worst repression since the 
Nasser years. Thousands of militants were arrested 
and the Brotherhood was not allowed to participate 
in municipal elections in 2008, while the regime 
launched a smear campaign portraying the 
Brotherhood to domestic elites and foreign partners 
as an organization of Nazis and Talibans. To foreign 
partners, the message was clear: if liberalization is 
too fast, you won’t get a more democratic Egypt, but 
an Islamic one. More importantly, the Islamist 
organization’s financial base was also hit by the 
arrest of businessmen and financiers whose 
combined investment was estimated at around 
US$4 billion (al-Anani, 2007). From 2006 to 2010, 
the regime managed successfully to curb the 
Islamists’ political influence, thus demonstrating 
once again that it was perfectly able to control the 
space allowed the Brotherhood. 
In 2007, the MB declared — for the first time since 
its establishment in 1928 — its intention to form a 
full-fledged political party, the program of which 
was leaked to the media by the independent news-
paper Al-Masry al-Youm. The program, though not 
officially recognized by the Brotherhood’s leader-
ship, was much criticized for being a step back with 
respect to the March 2004 Reform Initiative (Brown 
et al., 2008). Observers and the academia saw the 
2007 party platform as the end of the Brotherhood 
“reformist” experiment, with more so-called “grey 
areas” or points of ambiguity in the Brothers’ 
democratic “conversion.” This was probably to be 
ascribed to the old guard of salafis inside the 
organization, thus reinforcing the position of those 
advocating the theoretical incompatibility between 
Islamism (or even Islam) and liberal democracy.  
However, the ambiguities in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political program point more to the 
organization’s unwillingness or inability to build a 
real and solid alternative to the current regime, 
leaving — as already stated — the initiative to much 
weaker (in terms of social basis and organizational 
capacity) opposition forces, such as Kefaya or, since 
2010, Muhammad al-Baradei, etc.  
Two main factors have undermined the 
Brotherhood’s credibility and efficacy or its capacity 
to dictate the terms of the political debate without 
always being on the defensive. First of all, the 
authoritarian environment, implying cyclical 
repression and limitations on the freedom of action, 
has had the effect of ossifying internal debate and 
potential disagreement between different factions. 
These factions defy easy categorization, but can be 
classified in three major groups. The first is 
sometimes called the da’wa group, ideologically 
conservative and well-represented in the new (Janu-
ary 2010) Guidance Bureau and local branch offices, 
particularly in rural areas. The second, comprising 
pragmatic conservatives combining religious 
conservatism with a belief in the value of political 
participation, is probably the mainstream wing of 
the Brotherhood and is well represented between 
activists with legislative experience.58 The final 
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58 For example, well experienced parlamentarians such as Saad 
al-Katatni and Muhammad al-Mursi. 
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faction is the group of reformers, such as Abd al-
Moneim Abu al-Futuh, advocating a progressive 
interpretation of Islam and not well represented in 
the new Guidance bureau, nor within the rank and 
file of the organization.  
Hence, the MB — not dissimilarly from the ruling 
National Democratic Party — is not a coherent 
political organization, but rather a sum of different 
political trends that in a more open political context 
might split into different political organizations or 
parties. Under Mubarak’s presidency, for instance, 
there was no reason to have a split over the question 
of forming a political party, if that party was not 
going to be allowed to run for elections anyway.59 
The authoritarian environment has thus had the 
paradoxical effect of preserving both the ruling 
National Democratic Party and the main opposition 
representative, the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
organizations united by their lack of serious 
alternative venues and external competitors in their 
respective spheres.60 This state of affairs might, of 
course, change in the post-Mubarak political transi-
tion and many observers are already pointing to the 
emergence of autonomous and even competitive 
Islamist trends.61  
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59 This is the case of the already mentioned reformer, Abd el-
Moneim Abu al-Futuh, who until the events in February 2011 
was fully convinced of the futility of splitting up the mother 
organization after the al-wasat experience in the 1990s. 
Author’s interviews with Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh, Abu 
Ela Madi (al-Wasat), Hussam Tammam (independent 
analyst), Cairo, November 2010. 
60 On the NDP, see Issandr El Amrani’s paper in this report. 
61 Ashraf El Sherif, “The Brotherhood on the Edge of Reform,” 
Al-Masry al-Youm, April 4, 2011, 
A second and probably more central factor is the 
inherent contradiction of the Brotherhood’s 
program since the time it was founded: should the 
regime be considered legitimate or illegitimate? 
Considering it illegitimate would of course have 
implied direct confrontation and the risk of being 
completely erased from the political arena. Accept-
ing the regime as legitimate, however, could not be 
without consequences. Could the Brotherhood 
accept the rules of the game imposed by the regime 
for 40 years without losing credibility and political 
coherence in the eyes of its constituency? This 
dilemma — faced by all opposition forces when 
operating in an authoritarian setting — reappeared 
in 2009–10 when the issue of succession was at its 
peak, in the new round of parliamentary elections in 
November–December 2010, and even more force-
fully, as we will see shortly, in the Brotherhood’s 
hesitant stance towards the January 25 “revolution.” 
In 2009–10, numerous declarations made by the 
MB leadership pointed to the fact that the 
Brotherhood was not willing to engage the regime 
on presidential succession, for instance by directly 
opposing the candidature of Gamal Mubarak or by 
presenting, at least symbolically, its own candidate 
for presidential elections.62  
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http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/385618 or more 
tacitly, Khalil Anani, “Brother-tarianism,” Al-Masry al-Youm, 
06/04/201, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/388620. 
62 Author’s interviews, with MB members, February and 
November 2010, Cairo. See, for instance, the general guide 
Muhammad al-Badi’ interview with al-Jazira, January 22, 
2010: “We don’t oppose Gamal Mubarak’s candidacy as long 
as he will be considered as a normal citizen and the 
presidential elections will be free and fair,” full text in Arabic 
on Ana Ikhwan blog http://ana-
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As for the parliamentary elections of November 
2010, the regime made it perfectly clear after five 
years of heavy repression that it would not allow the 
Muslim Brotherhood to repeat the electoral success 
of 2005. Still the Brotherhood did not budge from 
its traditional position of participation, ignoring the 
fact that any form of participation in elections that 
are held in an unfair environment is tantamount to 
an endorsement of the regime.63 Together with the 
legal and regime-loyal opposition (the liberal Wafd 
and the leftist Tagammu’), the MB did not adhere to 
Muhammad al-Baradei’s call for a boycott of 
parliamentary elections. In the case of the MB and 
even more so of the Wafd, participation was seen as 
an attempt to appease the regime, as well as a 
reflection of the fact that despite its limitations, 
Parliament can serve opposition groups as a plat-
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ikhwan.blogspot.com/2010/01/blog-post_22.html. The only 
sign of mobilization in the prospect of a 2011 presidential 
elections has been the Brotherhood adherence to the initiative 
of Muhammad al-Baradei, former International Atomic 
Energy Agency head and now in-charge of the National 
Association for Change, whom the Islamists helped in 
collecting signatures in support of constitutional amendments 
allowing for cleaner presidential elections. 
63 See, for instance, Essam El-Erian interview with Michel 
Dunne, May 31, 2010, 
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/01/inte
rview-with-essam-al-arian. There was of course some internal 
disagreement, but the Brotherhood remained firm on the 
position expressed by its spokesperson. Author’s interviews 
with MB activists, November 2010, Cairo. See also Amr 
Hamzawy, “The Brotherhood enters elections in a weakened 
state,” Al-Masry al-Youm, November 17, 2010, 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/opinion/brotherhood-
enters-elections-weakened-state. 
form from which to reach out to the media and 
claim some leadership roles. However, the secular 
and regime-loyal opposition represented by the 
Wafd and the Tagammu’ had more reason, at least 
in theory, to participate as the prospects of getting a 
few seats were much better than those of their 
Islamist rivals. As it turned out, participation did 
not pay off as the election results were even worse 
than the Brotherhood (or perhaps even the 
regime64) predicted. The Muslim Brotherhood got 
no seat in the first round and finally decided for a 
late boycott of the December 5 run-off election 
together with the Wafd.  
From the foregoing, the Muslim Brotherhood 
emerges as a moderate reformist force willing to 
compromise with but not fundamentally challenge 
the regime. The result has been a loss of initiative 
among the Brotherhood, which remained the main 
opposition force in the country but at the price of 
losing credibility as an alternative to the regime, 
suffering from the same diseases as the other 
regime-loyal opposition forces. 
The lack of political initiative is well demonstrated 
by the fact that the Brotherhood not only did not 
lead, but also was taken by surprise by the mass 
mobilization of January 25, 2011. The MB’s very 
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64 The paradox underlined by various observers of the 
Egyptian political scene at the time was that the election 
results were not completely positive for the NDP as they had 
too little opposition to legitimize the planned presidential 
election of 2011. Michelle Dunne, “From Too Much Egyptian 
Opposition, to too little,” Al-Masry al-Youm, December 15, 
2010, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/opinion/too-much-
egyptian-opposition-too-little. See also Issandr El Amrani’s 
paper in this report. 
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first reaction was that of distancing itself from the 
demonstrations for fear of regime repression. It was 
only after three days, when the extent of the revolt 
could no longer be ignored, that it decided to join 
the protest with caution. The MB’s leadership was 
well aware of the certainty of harsh repression if it 
had participated and the revolt had failed; but they 
also knew the risk of being left behind if the revolt 
succeeded. After the demonstration of Friday, 
January 28, there was no turning back: in the event 
of a restoration of the old order, repression would 
have been extreme. As an analyst put it, the 
Brothers became “accidental revolutionaries.”65 
In general, during the protests, the MB played down 
the religious discourse and focused instead on issues 
of democracy and social justice. On various 
occasions the MB leadership repeated that the 
Brotherhood’s intention was not to establish an 
Islamic state, nor was it that of seeking authority, 
the presidency, or a majority in parliament, but 
rather that of bringing in comprehensive reforms in 
the political, economic, social, and other aspects of 
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65 ICG interview with Patrick Haenni. The first MB members 
to be involved were the younger members well connected to 
secular opposition and human rights activists through the 
internet and facebook. They participated spontaneously, 
without necessarily consulting with their leadership. There 
appear to have been a substantial difference between the MB 
young activists participation in Tahrir square and the MB 
participation elsewhere as in the Delta zone. Apparently, the 
MB presence is stronger in rural area (another result of regime 
repression for an historically urban movement) and outside 
Cairo mobilization was organized on more conventional basis 
through the traditional leadership (ICG, 2011). 
citizens lives and that it was representing all Egyp-
tians and not a single organization or a faction.66 
The MB’s cautious approach was, of course, meant 
to appease both domestic public opinion and 
international actors fearful of an Islamic takeover, a 
concern also encouraged to some extent by the 
regime’s rhetoric. But it was also an expression of 
the MB’s apprehensions of a “revolutionary” 
process that they had not contributed to igniting 
and over which they did not have any control. 
When the regime sought to split the opposition on 
February 6, inviting a variety of groups for “dialo-
gue” with the newly appointed Vice President Omar 
Suleiman, the Muslim Brotherhood agreed to 
participate along with representative of the NPD, 
the official opposition (including the Wafd, 
Tagammu’ and two smaller parties, the Democratic 
Generation Party and the Democratic Unionist 
Party), independent figures, and six self-appointed 
representatives of the protesters. It was only when 
the dialogue was vigorously rejected by the prote-
sters – and also by the MB youth – that the MB 
leadership was forced to take heed and reject the 
regime’s proposal for mediation.  
The events that followed confirmed the MB 
leadership’s moderate approach and preference for 
the “orderly transition” envisaged by the military. 
After formally assuming power on February 11, the 
military suspended the 1971 Constitution and 
appointed an eight-member constitutional 
committee (among them a Muslim Brother, two 
professors of law, and a respected judge). Despite 
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66 See for instance Essam El-Erian op-ed on the New York 
Times, “What the Muslim Brothers Want,” February 9, 2011. 
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pressure by activists for a complete overhaul of the 
constitution, however, the commission’s recom-
mendations were far narrower: on February 26, the 
military announced only nine proposed amend-
ments, to be voted on three weeks later.  
Egyptian public opinion was split between those 
favoring a No vote and those for a Yes vote. The 
reasons for the No campaign were based on the 
question of readiness. None of the opposition 
coalitions and movements had secured the 
resources or organization to mobilize large numbers 
in an effective way, and their supporters worried 
that the victory of those voting for Yes would result 
in a parliament divided between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and members of Mubarak’s old 
patronage network. Moreover, such a parliament 
would then be free to redraft the constitution to its 
liking.  
But the limited Cairo and Alexandria-based 
campaigns of those voting against had little chance 
of winning over the broader public. The Muslim 
Brotherhood and groups affiliated with the former 
party of Mubarak, the NDP, were in favor of the 
amendments. The Muslim Brotherhood initially 
distributed flyers urging the Yes vote as a religious 
obligation, but almost immediately it adopted the 
more acceptable slogan, “Yes is a vote for stability.”  
In the week leading up to the referendum, pro-
democracy activists and supporters had accused the 
military of coming to a power-sharing deal with the 
Brotherhood to preserve its hold on power. The 
armed forces had not explicitly taken a position on 
the amendments, but many activists reported that 
while they left Brotherhood members to freely 
campaign for Yes, they harassed youth activists who 
were calling on people to reject the proposed 
amendments, arresting several of them a day before 
the vote.67 
With parliamentary elections to be held in probably 
just a few months time, many political individuals 
or groups are talking about forming new parties, 
but just how easy that will be remains unclear. The 
Brotherhood announced on February 21 that it will 
form a party “Freedom and Justice” (hurriyya wa 
‘adala), which could broaden its base by allowing 
sympathizers to vote for it without joining the 
movement.68 On April 30, the Shura Council, the 
MB main legislative body, appointed Mohammad 
al-Mursy as president of the party, Essam al-Erian 
as vice president, and Saad al-Katatny as secretary 
general, all representatives of the so called main-
stream “pragmatic conservative” trend inside the 
Brotherhood. The appointees affirmed that the 
party is independent from the mother organization 
and that membership would be open to all Egyp-
tians. They also declared that they will run for a 
maximum of 50 percent of the parliamentary 
contested seats in the September poll. This decision 
contradicts earlier statements made by several 
group leaders affirming that the organization would 
not contest more than 30 percent of the People’s 
Assembly seats. 
However, it is still unclear whether the party will be 
legalized, since the constitutional amendments left 
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67 El Rashidi, Yasmine, “Egypt’s First Vote,” The New York 
Review of Books, Blog, March 24, 2011. 
68 “Press release on the proclamation of the name of the 
political party of the Muslim Brotherhood,” Muslim 
Brotherhood, February 21, 2011 
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the controversial Article 5, which bars any political 
activity “with a religious frame of reference,” 
untouched. In general, it is likely that the Islamist 
political field would become more diversified. Some 
observers speculate that the Brotherhood might lose 
votes to other Islamic parties — including those that 
emerge out of its own ranks. Indeed, it faces 
competition from the Wasat Party, formed by 
erstwhile members who broke off to pursue a more 
liberal agenda. 
As the transition unfolds, the tensions and fault 
lines inside the Brotherhood undoubtedly will play 
themselves out — between an older and younger 
generation of Brothers; between traditional hierar-
chical structures and modern forms of mobilization; 
between a more conservative and a more reformist 
outlook; between Cairo and other major cities and 
rural areas.  
The future of the Brotherhood and the role it could 
possibly play in the post-Mubarak Egypt would 
depend on whether the current transition would 
actually lead to a more participatory and democratic 
political space and if that is the case, whether the 
Brotherhood would be capable of rapidly adapting 
to act in a more competitive environment. 
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Quite differently from other opposition forces, the 
MB is not just a political organization but also has 
an important or even preponderantly social 
component. Some observers argued that, due to 
political repression, the Brotherhood has recently 
started refocusing its attention on its da’wa activi-
ties, that is to say proselytism and social work. The 
election of Muhammad al-Badie’, a conservative, as 
the new general guide in January 2010 was widely 
interpreted as a sign of this “retreat from politics” 
(Hamzawy et al., 2010). But what are the 
Brotherhood’s social activities and social project? 
Has the political repression of the last 15 years or so 
affected also the social (charitable) side of the 
organization? 
Considering the importance of social action for 
Islamist mass movements of which the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood is the prototype or mother 
organization, it is surprising to note that there is no 
updated study on the state of the Brotherhood’s 
social activities in Egypt. Most of the studies on the 
MB take for granted that a) the organization has a 
large social base, and b) that this social base mainly 
originates from its efficient network of charities 
providing services in health and education to the 
people. Additionally, it is assumed that precisely 
this social charities’ network was the most impor-
tant challenge the Islamists have posed to the state-
regime in Egypt, as elsewhere. According to this 
view, Islamists could “easily” decide to abandon 
their strictly political activities to concentrate on 
social work and da’wa.  
Indeed, social action linked to a project of social 
justice was a central feature of the Brotherhood 
until the 1940s (Lia, 1998). The MB was established 
as a social movement and only later devoted its 
attention to politics in the strict sense. However, the 
relationship between social and political work was 
reversed when the Brotherhood was allowed to re-
organize after Nasser’s repression and when its new 
leadership started to give priority to political 
participation and activities (al-Awadi, 2004; 
Elshobaki, 2005). Experience in the professional 
associations was of paramount importance for the 
training of a new generation of activists, given the 
know-how it provided on the working of the public 
administration, and also about the organization of 
social services at the national level. The oft-quoted 
episode of the Brothers’ efficient intervention after 
the Cairo earthquake of 1992 was precisely an 
example of a rescue operation organized by the 
professional associations, mainly doctors and engi-
neers. 
The 1980s and 1990s were also the decades of the 
revitalization of religious charities, partly 
spontaneous and partly encouraged by the regime. 
Starting with the 1970s, the regime authorized the 
building of private mosques and the private and 
local collection of zakat (alms giving) funds which 
could be used to finance charitable associations (al-
jam’iyya al-khayriyya) providing basic social 
services to the population in health and education 
(Ben Nefissa et al., 1995; Sullivan et al., 1999). The 
regime was starting to search for a palliative for the 
otherwise potentially explosive socio-economic 
situation caused by the state’s increasing difficulty 
in providing social services (Pioppi, 2007).69 What 
could be better for this purpose than a revalued 
religious charity, provided it was kept under state 
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69 On the welfare state retrenchment see M. Cristina Paciello’s 
paper in this report. 
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control and not politicized? The Muslim 
Brotherhood, of course, participated in the charity 
boom even though, compared to the entire Islamic 
sector, the MB-controlled charities remained a 
minority.70  
When the new cycle of repression started in the 
mid-1990s, the social activities of the MB were also 
heavily limited. Not only were the activities of the 
Brothers in the professional syndicates effectively 
reduced, but mosques and related charitable associ-
ations started to be “(re)-nationalized.”71  
It is difficult to provide a detailed reconstruction of 
the MB’s social activities after the mid-1990s. Due 
to the tense relationship with the regime and the 
organization’s illegal status, no formal list is 
available to the public. Also, there is no central 
organization coordinating the Brotherhood’s social 
activities today, as was the case in the 1930s and 
1940s. The charity section (Qism al-Birr) is mainly 
responsible for small-scale charitable activities, such 
as the distribution of food and other goods during 
Ramadan.72 All MB social activities are organized in 
the form of independent charitable associations 
(jam’iyya khayriyya) founded by individual 
members of the Brotherhood (often businessmen or 
well-off individuals) on a private basis. They have a 
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70 Sullivan et al., 1999; Author’s interviews Cairo, November 
2010. 
71 Kienle, 2001; al-Awadi, 2004. Author’s interviews, Cairo, 
November 2010. 
72 Author’s interview with Medhat ‘Asem, Director of Islamic 
Medical Association and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Cairo, February 2010, and with Abdel Rahman al-Barr, 
Responsible of the Qism al-Birr, Cairo, November 2010. 
“spiritual” link with the jama’a and use the 
Brotherhood’s informal network, but are both 
financially and administratively independent.73  
A charitable association is usually financed by an 
initial donation by the founder or a group of bene-
factors. But once the association starts functioning, 
it becomes self-financing through a system of fees 
applied to the offered services, not unlike the 
private commercial sector. Furthermore, 
associations do not rely on volunteer work, but have 
waged employees who do not necessarily have to be 
members of the Brotherhood. The same thing goes 
for the users, who can be of any religion, sex, and 
political affiliation. All charitable associations are 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, which also grants the initial permission to 
operate, together with the Ministry of Health or 
Education, depending on the service provided. 
This somewhat “decentralized” or rather, frag-
mented nature of the system, with no formal 
organization coordinating the different charities 
established and administered by the Brothers, has 
apparently been reinforced after the repression 
cycle of the 1990s in parallel with a general reduc-
tion in social activities linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.74 
Today, in the field of health care, there is only one 
Brotherhood-linked charity: the Islamic Medical 
Association (IMA, al-jam’iyya al-tibbiyya al-
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73 Author’s interview with Hussam Tammam, Cairo, February 
and November 2010. 
74 Author’s interview with Abdel Moneim Mahmud, journalist 
and author of the Ana Ikhwan blog, Cairo, February 2010. 
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islamiyya75), which controls 23 health units 
throughout Egypt and is currently building a central 
hospital in Madinat el-Nasser, Cairo.76 In the 
education sector, there is no comparable 
association, but there are about 30 independent 
schools scattered around the country.77 In general, 
these social activities are located in the bigger cities 
and in middle to upper class neighborhoods, that is, 
in the areas in which the potential donors and users 
live. Consequently, their target is not the most 
disadvantaged social strata, but the middle classes 
who do not want to use public services due to their 
low quality, but cannot afford the most expensive 
private services in health and education.78  
From this brief analysis, it could be argued that 
Brotherhood-related social activities are extremely 
reduced today and certainly not enough to play a 
relevant role in mobilization. This is confirmed by 
the lack of an explicit political or social project 
linked to these associations. Of course, the regime 
has imposed specific limits on the possibility of 
political expression inside the charitable 
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75 The IMA was established in 1977 by Ahmad al-Malt, a 
doctor and vice general leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
http://www.imaegypt.net/p02.htm. 
76 The IMA has 10 medical units in greater Cairo, the largest of 
which — the Faruq Hospital in Maadi — has a 50-bed 
capacity. Author’s interviews with Medhat ‘Asem, director of 
IMA, Cairo, February and November 2010 and with the 
director and vice-director of the Faruq Hospital, Cairo, 
November 2010. 
77 An example is the Madaris al-Rodwan in Madinat el-Nasser, 
Cairo. Author’s interview with the director, Cairo, February 
2010. 
78 Author’s interviews, Cairo, February and November 2010. 
associations: associations cannot host political 
meetings or any other event or sign of politicization 
(banners), especially if Brotherhood-related. Yet, 
the result is that there is no way of distinguishing a 
Brotherhood-linked charitable association from a 
non-Brotherhood one, unless the names and 
political affiliation of the members of the 
administrative board are known. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s documents and political 
statements in recent years regarding health and 
education in Egypt reveal a program that is not very 
detailed and lacking a clear distinction from the 
welfare policies and reforms presented by the 
regime. The Brotherhood is in favor of greater 
reliance on private providers of social services and 
partnership between the public administration and 
private entrepreneurs, both in terms of private 
investments and private charities to compensate the 
deficiencies of the welfare state. Even the wording of 
the programs is very similar to those of the National 
Democratic Party.79 
In addition, the Brotherhood’s parliamentary activ-
ities on social issues are concentrated on general 
questions such as the fight against corruption or 
public inefficiency without, for instance, entering 
into the specifics of the reforms that are being 
carried out in the country and will have a great 
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79 See, for example, the Brotherhood campaign platform for 
the 2008 municipal, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=16257, or for the 
2010 parliamentary elections, 
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/brotherhood-platform.pdf, on 
health, and compare with the NDP “Health and population 
policies,” http://www.ndp.org.eg/ar/Policies/_1.aspx. 
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impact on Egypt’s future welfare system.80 This is 
even more striking given that there is a relatively 
large debate on health and education reforms as 
well as an opposition bloc in the country against 
them. In the last five years, the opposition bloc has 
managed to inform Egyptian public opinion 
through events, media campaigns, publications, and 
so on and to legally engage the government by 
denouncing the unconstitutional nature of the most 
extreme privatization measures, thus effectively 
reducing the regime’s freedom of action. The 
activists of the Committee for the Defence of the 
Right to Health81 lament the absence of the main 
opposition force, the Muslim Brotherhood, in this 
important battle and accuse it of being 100 percent 
in favor of the regime’s policies.82 
On another front, the Brotherhood has been visibly 
absent from the workers’ protest movement in the 
last years.83 Besides some timid attempts to be 
represented in the workers’ trade unions in 1998, 
2002, and again in 2006, there is no sign of an active 
role by the Brotherhood in organizing workers’ 
strikes and demonstrations. In this respect, the 
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80 On health and education reforms, see M. Cristina Paciello’s 
paper in this report. 
81 This is a network of NGOs working on health and 
sustainable development, http://www.ahedegypt.org/. 
82 Author’s interview with Muhammad Khalil, activist for the 
Committee for the Defence of the Right to Health, Cairo, 
Fenruary 2010. 
83 Al-Hamalawy, Hossam (2007), “Comrades and Brothers,” 
Middle East Report, n. 242, Spring, 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer242/hamalawy.html and 
author’s interview with Hossam Hamalawy, Cairo, November 
2010. 
Brotherhood has kept its traditional paternalist and 
corporatist approach aimed at reconciling labor and 
capital  in the attempt to appease social conflicts. 
The mainstream Sunni Islamist view, represented 
by the Brotherhood, is deeply hostile to class 
conflict. The ideal society is a harmonious one in 
which labor is productive and capitalists generous 
through charity (Beinin et al., 1998; Heanni et al., 
2009).  
To sum up, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social activi-
ties after the Nasser parenthesis have never reached 
the levels of diffusion and organization of the 1930s 
and 1940s. Furthermore, they are generally aimed at 
the middle to upper classes rather than the most 
disadvantaged social strata. Since the repression 
cycle that started in the 1990s, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s social activities have been drastically 
reduced and do not seem to play a significant role in 
popular mobilization, not least for lack of a clear 
political and social project. 
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The 40 years of co-existence with a (neo-)authorita-
rian regime have not left the Muslim Brotherhood 
in a good state of health. Apart from the internal 
lack of coherence and unity, the Brotherhood lacks 
a clear and original agenda. It has also not been able 
to significantly influence the national political 
arena. In the last decade or so, most of the time the 
jama’a has reacted to the initiatives of the regime or 
other (weaker but more active) opposition forces. In 
terms of social activities too, the Brotherhood’s 
reach has been severely reduced, to the extent that 
some argue that the only real links to popular 
constituencies till November 2010 were the 
members of parliament and their local offices, 
which were the only visible signs of the jama’a in 
many popular districts around the country.84 While 
this provides a further explanation for the MB’s 
unwillingness to boycott the November 2010 
parliamentary elections, it also casts an even 
grimmer light on the current state of the organiza-
tion. Certainly, the main explanation for the current 
state of affairs should be sought in the regime’s 
repressive policies, but perhaps also in the excessive 
moderation of the Brotherhood, which, not unlike 
the other official opposition forces in Egypt, paid 
the price of survival in an authoritarian context. 
This state of affairs is confirmed by the 
Brotherhood’s late and modest role in the events of 
January–February 2011.  
With this negative picture, we do not mean that 
Islamism is becoming anachronistic in post-
Mubarak Egypt. What one wants to underline is 
that one of the early victims of the popular move-
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84 Author’s interview with Abdel Moneim Mahmud, journalist 
and author of Ana Ikhwan blog, Cairo, November 2010. 
ment of January-February 2011 might be the MB’s 
hegemonic role as opposition, a role that had been 
granted more due to political stagnation and autho-
ritarian clout than due to the almost mythical 
organizational strength and mass base of the 
historic Islamist movement. The future role of the 
Brotherhood would depend as much on its ability to 
reform itself and take advantage of the new situa-
tion. Conservatives in control of the group’s 
Guidance Bureau are likely to support the army in 
the hope that an “orderly transition” will grant the 
MB an inflated status in the forthcoming elections. 
But this will certainly attract criticism not only from 
the wider Egyptian public, but also from factions 
within the Brotherhood’s own ranks. Long-awaited 
new political organizations — more representative 
of the middle-class youth who spearheaded the 
protest movement and of the long-marginalized 
Egyptian lower social sectors — might be in the 
making. In that case, the Brotherhood might lose 
ground and find itself competing with equals on a 
more level playing field. That is, of course if the 
political space opened up by recent events does not 
get closed again due to an authoritarian restoration 
of the regime. 
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In the 1980–90s, although Egypt’s flamboyant 
regional and international profile linked to the 
Nasser years had become a thing of the past, Egypt 
remained a heavyweight in the Middle East and a 
key checkmate on the regional chessboard, espe-
cially in Washington’s eyes. In successive years, 
however, Egyptian foreign policy became increa-
singly marginalized, a fact deeply resented by Arab 
and Egyptian observers nostalgic about the 
country’s active role during the Nasser years (Al-
Hayat, June 14, 2010). This was neither a simple 
side-effect nor a revamping of Arab nationalist 
leanings critical of Egypt’s official stance. The 
fundamentals of Egyptian foreign policy have 
remained the same, as Egypt remains intrinsically 
located in a triangular relationship with the United 
States and Israel. Yet Egyptian foreign policy has 
been subjected to jolts, even shocks in the fast-
changing new context, finding itself increasingly 
unable to act autonomously, unlike in the past.  
In recent years, Egypt’s role in the Middle East 
seems to have been overshadowed by the rise of new 
regional actors such as Turkey and (from a different 
angle) Iran, especially in traditional Egyptian 
preserves such as the Palestinian-Israeli question, 
where Egypt now only plays the role of a follower 
without much capacity for initiative. The same is 
true for other “Arab national questions” (qidayat 
arabiyya, as the Arab nationalist discourse puts it): 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, along with Iran, have been 
very active in calming the political situation in 
Lebanon after the 2006 summer war, which had 
side-effects on the entire Near East. Even in the 
Horn of Africa — where Egypt’s location defines 
some vital interests, prime among these being the 
flow of water from the Nile — Egypt has been 
conspicuously absent. In May 2010, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda signed a separate 
deal that questioned the 1959 agreement on the 
sharing of the waters of the Nile. The same holds 
true of conferences relating to the reconstruction of 
Somalia. Furthermore, the current weakening of 
Egyptian foreign policy is not just related to inter-
national or regional factors. A key factor that 
aggravates the enduring trends of the 1990s is that 
Egypt is also currently weakened by its domestic 
difficulties, with all eyes initially being turned on 
President Mubarak’s succession and now on the 
consequences of his ousting in 2011. The entire 
state apparatus has become ossified and paralyzed 
due to this transitional period, which has had direct 
effects on the state’s capacity to define foreign 
policy. However, the basics of Egyptian foreign and 
regional policy still hold. 
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The 1979 peace treaty with Israel had signaled a 
strategic shift as compared to the preceding years 
and this has remained the fundamental context for 
Egyptian foreign policy (Quandt, 1988 and 1990). 
Egypt has since then forsaken war with Israel and 
has located itself in a triangular relationship with 
Israel and the United States.85 Its policy is not 
dictated from abroad, as rapid-fire opinions would 
imply; its security policy has for quite some time 
now had an essential dependency component. With 
Camp David (1978–79), Egypt gave up some of its 
freedom to define its security (in the larger sense of 
the term) autonomously. Peace with Israel has 
remained a “cold peace,” a step back from 
normalization, yet Egypt has kept to the letter of the 
treaty. Hence its foreign policy has become “depen-
dent,” not in the traditional sense of dependency on 
a sole imperial center (viz., the dependency theory 
with roots in Latin America), but in a reformulated 
sense, namely, its acceptance of a constraining stra-
tegic relationship, in which the United States plays a 
pivotal role. Some may prefer the term “close inter-
dependence” (a term used for instance to 
summarize Mexico’s relations with its bigger 
northern neighbor), to account for the way Egypt 
has cast its lot with the United States without falling 
too closely in line with it. 
A caveat should immediately be added here. The 
Egyptian stance has also been a kind of “gamble” on 
the part of Egyptian elites to save their system, a 
move initiated by President Sadat after the October 
war (1973). Therefore, it would not be correct to 
view Egyptian foreign policy as exclusively driven 
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85 See the hearings of the U.S. House of Representatives, “The 
U.S.-Israel-Egypt Triangular Relationship,” May 21, 2008. 
by U.S. and Israeli interests. Peace with Israel was 
not merely a goal in itself, but also a means to 
achieve other Egyptian objectives. Since 1979, Egypt 
has been the second largest recipient, after Israel, of 
U.S. foreign assistance — the United States has 
provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2 
billion in economic and military foreign assistance 
since 1979.  
Egypt’s foreign policy dependency has a security 
component as well, as U.S. aid has helped the 
“modernization” of the Egyptian military, a 
euphemism for help given to sustain an essential 
mainstay of the regime. No surprise then that 
support for the peace treaty with Israel is greater in 
the officer’s corps than in Egyptian society 
(Alterman, 1998). This dependency also has an 
inherent economic component, as tens of billions of 
dollars have been injected in the form of American 
aid to uphold the Egyptian state’s redistributive role 
(i.e., maintaining subsidies on consumer goods, on 
government employment and on plummeting 
budget deficits). Even controversial deals with Israel 
(like the Qualified Industrial Zones, whose products 
enjoy tariff-free entry into the U.S. markets) are 
related to Egypt’s interests as they are meant to 
boost the national economy: the positive effects may 
not trickle down to all strata of Egyptian society, but 
they are part of a genuine and paternalistic way of 
thinking of the country’s high profile decision-
makers, who are convinced that they are doing their 
best to upgrade the Egyptian economy in the region 
and in the world.  
As a corollary to its close strategic relations with the 
United States, Egypt has gained a critical role in the 
Middle East, first of all as a partner in the resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This has proved 
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vital for many other delicate strategic, diplomatic, 
and military issues in the region related to peace 
and stability in the Middle East (Barnett, 1998). 
Egypt has also been an active partner of the United 
States in maintaining regional security, especially in 
the Gulf. Hence Egypt has become a key component 
of U.S. power in the Middle East. Conversely, it has 
exploited its role as a bridge to the Arab world in 
order to enhance its value in the eyes of the United 
States. All this is linked to national interest as seen 
from the perspective of the Egyptian elite 
surrounding former President Mubarak — partial 
recognition of Israel and a cold peace with it, 
limited liberalization and political openings inside 
Egypt, capitalist development benefiting those close 
to the regime, security guarantees from the United 
States and a continuing leading role in the Arab 
world.86 
Foreign policy is fundamentally a means of navi-
gating amidst constraints as well as defining an 
independent path for a given state. This is exempli-
fied by Egypt’s behavior, in the context of 
“(inter)dependent security,” that has become much 
more asymmetric when the United States found 
itself in an unprecedented position of dominance in 
the region after the end of the Cold War. Though 
Egypt’s behavior was derivative rather than 
intrinsic, due to its ability to manipulate more 
powerful states (first of all the United States), Egypt 
was able to define its own way in the Middle East. 
The Mubarak regime deftly managed to navigate 
through the tumultuous Arab concert and was able 
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86 On the Egyptian system see Waterbury (1983) and Kerr et 
al. (1982). 
to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy designed to 
further Egyptian national interests and power.  
In the 1980s, Egypt had bolstered its credentials as a 
vital power in the Middle East and returned back 
into the Arab concert in 1989, after having been 
isolated by the Arabs in 1980 in view of the Camp 
David accord. Egypt’s contribution to the Gulf war 
in 1991 had also been substantial and Cairo had 
acquired some say in subsequent discussions on 
security in the Gulf. In the 1990s, Egypt was a 
critical partner in the peace process promoted by 
the Clinton administration. Though 
“(inter)dependent security” — namely, security 
relations in cooperation with the United States or in 
the ambit of a triangular relationship with the 
United States and Israel — is the main subtext of 
Egyptian foreign policy, Egypt was able to define for 
itself an autonomous way. Egypt’s preserve had 
been the Palestinian-Israeli question, first with 
Egypt’s essential role as an efficient go-between 
Israel and the Palestinians, and, more recently, as a 
mediator between Palestinian factions. Moreover, 
on the regional plane, Egypt coordinated with 
Jordan, kept contact with Saudi Arabia, and always 
kept an open channel with Syria, a difficult partner. 
Egypt also coordinated on a regular basis with the 
Gulf countries. It realized the importance of having 
stronger relations with Iran, although it struggled 
against excessive Iranian interference in Arab affairs 
(as for example in Iraq, in Lebanon with Hezbollah, 
and in Syria) and even in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (as a result of Iran’s support to Hamas).  
More broadly, Egypt has fostered the idea of 
fighting extremism in the region and has opened 
other channels for peaceful solutions. Egypt would 
like to contain Hamas (because of its links with the 
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Egyptian Muslim Brothers) because the country is 
opposed to Islamists wielding real political power. It 
has been actively campaigning for a Middle East 
free from weapons of mass destruction during the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty discussions.  
Egypt also played a part in containing the Turkish-
Syrian dispute in 1998. It was active in getting the 
water ministers of the Nile Basin countries to 
approve a new initiative for cooperation. It played a 
role in numerous initiatives aimed at buttressing the 
stability of Sudan and Ethiopia. It was a founding 
member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 
1995 and an active member of the NATO Mediter-
ranean dialogue. This flurry of Egyptian diplomatic 
activity exemplifies Egypt’s ability to define its own 
way within the context of “(inter)dependent secu-
rity.” 
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Although the basics of Egyptian regional and 
foreign policy still hold, they are no longer able to 
give shape to an Egyptian role, as other factors have 
been added to the equation. Two pivotal factors that 
weigh on Egypt’s diplomatic capability are the 
increased American involvement in the Palestinian-
Israeli issue and the heightened pressures on the 
Egyptian economy.  
First, although Egypt’s importance has increased in 
American eyes as the United States has taken a 
greater interest in the resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, an increased American 
involvement has weakened Egypt’s margin for 
maneuverability and has associated it too closely 
with American projects. In the second half of the 
1990s, America’s increased interest in the 
Palestinian-Israeli question first brought these 
contradictions to the fore. Egypt was indeed seen as 
a critical partner by the Clinton administration at a 
time when the latter was taking a strong interest in 
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and Egypt’s support 
helped legitimize America’s role and presence in the 
Middle East. Egypt also played a crucial role in 
unifying Palestinian ranks in support for the peace 
process, after the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in the 1990s. Yet, because of the 
disparity in power between Egypt and the United 
States and, also, because of the U.S. ignorance of the 
complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli file, any 
American involvement was bound not to reflect the 
complexity on the ground. It would also have put 
Egyptian diplomacy in a tight corner, having to 
follow American lines and at the same time having 
to alleviate the consequences of such choices on the 
ground. As a result, increasingly in the 1990s, Egypt 
came to be seen by Washington as a crucial partner 
that acquiesced privately but failed to demonstrate 
any concrete support for a given deal — a trend that 
culminated in President Clinton trying to force a 
final deal on both parties in the Camp David II 
summit in 2000, following the collapse of the so-
called Oslo process. This was clear proof of an 
Egyptian diplomacy trapped by an excessive 
American involvement in the peace process. 
Second, in the 1990s Egypt found itself severely 
weakened by the progressive reach of globalization 
in international economic relations and its inroads 
into the Middle East economies. The Egyptian 
economy was transformed due to the reorientation 
of activities induced by massive external financial 
resources. It had to adjust to new economic trends. 
Despite that, the Egyptian economy has not been 
integrated into world markets and has “de-globa-
lized” while simultaneously under threat of losing 
domestic markets to foreign competitors (Henry et 
al., 2010). The economy is far from competitive, 
and therefore does not meet an essential standard in 
the world of globalization of a country yearning for 
a regional role: it is much more of an inward-
looking crony capitalism controlled by a nexus of 
state enterprises managers, former officers, crony 
capitalists linked to power holders, and uncompeti-
tive privatized enterprises with no say in what is 
going on. This is exemplified by the sinking into 
quicksand of the “Gore-Mubarak partnership” (for 
economic growth), a high-level initiative taken by 
Vice President Al-Gore in 1994 to get President 
Mubarak to reform, privatize, and deregulate the 
Egyptian economic system.  
Today, the economy has become a liability for Egypt 
in international circles where rentierism is no 
longer the best strategy for a country yearning for 
2 

JOLTS, SHOCKS, AND DIFFICULTIES  
IN EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY 

 70 THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
 

an international role. As a corollary, economic 
issues and U.S. aid have become essential concerns 
for the Egyptian diplomacy in its dealings with the 
United States. Aid has increasingly not been taken 
for granted by Egyptian officials whenever talks 
surface in the United States, especially in Congress, 
about the utility of a large package aid or the possi-
bility of linking economic aid with the promotion of 
democracy. Periodically, the Egyptian government 
has launched intense behind-the-scene lobbying 
efforts and sent many spokespersons to Capitol Hill. 
Undoubtedly, Egypt has been weakened by 
increasing external economic pressures. 
The end-result of all this is that rather than just 
benefiting from its strategic posture to get some 
leeway for itself, Egyptian foreign policy has increa-
singly been put in a corner. The result is the 
declining power of Egypt exemplified, in American 
eyes, by M. Indyk’s assessment of the Mubarak 
regime (borrowing the phrase from Shakespeare) as 
“weary, stale, flat, and un-profitable — except for 
those lucky enough to be associated with it” (Indyk, 
2002). This kind of harsh criticism is symptomatic 
of the United States’ concerns about Egypt, but with 
no direct consequence, insofar as there is also the 
converse view that too much of a push for change 
might be detrimental to U.S. vital interests and 
might disrupt the efforts to promote peace. Egyp-
tian officials, on their part, have not hesitated to 
raise the bogey of the Algerian precedent of Islam-
ists coming to power to frighten the United States. 
This has helped them to retain a free hand in 
domestic matters in exchange for helping the 
United States carry out its policies on peace. U.S.-
Egyptian relations, however, have been oversha-
dowed by increasing recriminations, from both 
sides, with the Egyptians being convinced that they 
have done too much for the United States, and 
conversely the United States feeling that the 
Egyptians have done too little. 
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The existing unstable equilibrium posed a challenge 
of some gravity for Egyptian diplomacy after 
September 11, 2001. That day’s attacks acted as a 
brutal shock (quite different from the recurring jolts 
of the past) at a difficult juncture, as Egypt found 
itself in a defensive position, with the United States 
flirting with ideas such as “drying up” the Egyptian 
swamp (the same holds true for another U.S. close 
ally in the region, Saudi Arabia), followed by the 
shocking revelation that the terrorists had come 
mainly from countries considered close allies of the 
United States (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). The 
Egyptian regime was accused of letting an anti-
American consensus reign in Egypt, as a convenient 
means of channeling criticism toward the United 
States and Israel rather than the former’s own 
shortcomings, and was accused of breeding 
extremism which fuelled Al-Qaeda. The new 
American discourse on democratization (“a forward 
strategy of freedom” to borrow the George W. Bush 
administration’s catch phrase) weakened Egypt’s 
status. At least from 2002 until 2006, Egypt found 
itself with its back to the wall due to the shift in 
American foreign policy, from the former emphasis 
on regional stability based on U.S. reliance on 
authoritarian Arab regimes to an aggressive push 
towards rapid reforms and democratization. Egypt 
was criticized for resisting economic reforms, for 
maintaining a slow pace in the normalization (the 
so-called “cold peace”) with Israel, and for being an 
archaic social and political system said to be 
conducive to breeding extremism and terrorism. As 
a result, Egyptian diplomacy disappeared from the 
region, and was left with a defensive reactive stance 
(Droz-Vincent, 2007). 
Furthermore, the new American way of thinking 
about the Palestinian-Israeli project — a pivotal 
project for sustaining Egypt’s diplomatic profile —
reflected directly on Egypt’s diplomatic stance, as its 
ability to sustain an autonomous diplomacy is 
directly related to the importance of the peace 
process (although too much of an American 
involvement can stifle any Egyptian space for 
maneuver, as explained above). This leads one to 
assume that whenever the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
process was considered a strategic asset by 
American decision-makers, Egypt’s role was 
regarded as crucial. Yet the G .W. Bush administra-
tion first neglected this difficult portfolio (in the 
first half of 2001) and then did not place a high 
enough priority on the resolution of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict (2002–08), focusing instead on what 
it saw as more efficient strategic keys, such as 
reshaping the Middle East according to a 
democratic rationale, exemplified first and foremost 
by “regime change” in Iraq. This decline in U.S. 
peace activity led to the undermining of Egypt’s 
centrality. And the United States came to look at the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict through the narrow 
prism of violence/terrorism (e.g., through the Road 
Map, the Quartet’s conditions on Hamas). It 
insisted on Palestinians putting an end to violence, 
hence vouchsafing Prime Minister Sharon’s security 
solutions. Egypt found itself isolated, left to save the 
remnants of the Oslo accords and to maintain a few 
back channels open between Palestinians and 
Israelis. 
Egypt even lost its ability to play an autonomous 
role in what were strictly considered “Arab affairs” 
(qidayat arabiya). It sponsored a conference on Iraq 
in November 2004, but it turned out to be a short-
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cut solution under strict guidance from Washington 
with Egypt being seen only as a venue, without 
room for maneuver, and without the support of the 
Americans in its efforts to reinstall Iraq within Arab 
dynamics. As it happened, this meeting was not 
fruitful as Iraq descended into the chaos of civil war 
in 2006–07.  
Turkey has begun to position itself to fill the leader-
ship vacuum in the Middle East, its leaders being 
driven by a clear vision aimed at muscling the 
country’s way in the region and becoming a lead 
actor. It has engaged in all kinds of efforts in the 
Middle East (the so-called “zero-problems” policy 
with its neighbors, introduced by foreign policy 
advisor and then minister of foreign affairs, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu). It orchestrated indirect Syrian-Israeli 
talks. It has transformed itself into a critically 
important country for Iraq because of its relations 
with the central government as well as the Kurdish 
Regional Government. It has begun to take a role in 
the Palestinian question after the Israeli offensive in 
Gaza in 2009 that culminated in the flotilla incident 
in 2010. In May 2010, Turkey (along with Brazil, as 
non-permanent members of the UN Security 
Council) offered a package deal for negotiations on 
the Iranian nuclear question. Making use of 
regional opportunities, Turkey has proved much 
more efficient than Egypt in positioning itself in the 
Middle East, and has lost no effort in using its role 
in the Palestinian conflict to its advantage.  
Iran has also been able to enter more deeply into the 
regional Arab concert, playing on other sensitive 
issues in a much more efficient way than it had 
done in the 1980s, at the heydays of the so-called 
“exportation of the Islamic revolution.” Egypt’s role 
as a trailblazer in the Middle East has been taken up 
by other countries, which have displayed the ability 
to project themselves in the context of economic 
globalization and American interventionism in the 
region. Turkey is using its fast-growing and globa-
lizing economy and its diplomatic stance as parallel 
or alternative (but not opposed to U.S.) facilitators 
on numerous issues. Iran is playing the “resistance” 
card vis-à-vis American hegemony. Both countries 
have been the most “successful” actors in the 
Middle East in the 2000s. In contrast, Egypt has 
been unable to catch up and reinstate its centrality, 
despite its recognition by a George W. Bush 
administration in disarray (according to Wikileaks 
cables) as a valuable ally in its role as mediator, in 
its support to Iraq’s fledging government, and in its 
backing the United States in the latter’s 
confrontation with Iran. 
As a consequence, Egypt has been sidelined to a 
secondary position. It remains active, but in a 
defensive way. It reacts to outside pressures rather 
than taking the initiative or parting in setting the 
agenda. And its foreign policy has been refocused 
on a few specific topics, first among these being the 
issue of Gaza. It has concentrated not on starting 
new peace negotiations or at least playing the role of 
facilitator, but on managing perceived threats to 
Egyptian national interests: Egyptian officials 
harbor fears that Israel may “outsource” the 
management of Gaza to Egypt, that the Palestinian 
conflict might spill into Egypt, or in the Sinai 
(where relations are tense) or even in Egyptian 
cities, that Palestinian groups may play the strategy 
of tension and resort to mobilizing the “Egyptian 
street,” and that Gaza may become a base for 
extremist groups in Egypt. All these concerns have 
been encompassed within a new discourse on 
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“national security.”87 Hence there has been a 
“securitization” of Egyptian foreign policy, with an 
increasing role being played in foreign policy by 
mukhabarat (intelligence) chief Omar Soleiman and 
his aides. That stance may be seen as useful by the 
United States, which is experiencing difficulties in 
restarting negotiations and therefore in managing 
the situation on the ground. Egypt has been instru-
mental, following Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s 
unilateral “disengagement” from Gaza in 2005, in 
the management of the Rafah crossing between 
Gaza and Egypt (as negotiated by Secretary of State 
Rice). It has also played an essential role in the 
rebuilding of the PA’s security forces under the 
Quartet’s guidance. This strategy, however, failed 
when, in January 2006, Palestinians voted a 
majority of Hamas representatives to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. Egypt’s inability to advance 
other ideas and its reluctant (and occasionally 
anguished) pursuit of American positions has put 
its diplomacy in a Catch-22 situation — for 
instance, in 2007 when Egypt was said to have 
participated in the failed U.S.-Israeli covert actions 
aimed at ousting Hamas from power in Gaza 
(according to a report in Vanity Fair, April 2008) or 
in 2008 when Israel assaulted Gaza. In reality, Egypt 
did not have a role in these initiatives, except that of 
a reluctant follower of American wishful thinking 
and simplistic ideas on how to “solve” (in other 
words “contain”) Hamas after its election in January 
2006. Egypt did not have the ability to forge an 
alternative and it found itself in a conundrum — it 
did not want Hamas to “succeed,” but at the same 
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87 T. Aklimendos, La guerre de Gaza vue d’Egypte, unpublished 
text kindly forwarded by the author. 
time it knew that it would not benefit from the 
destruction of Gaza or by an eventual escalation of 
hostilities in the region. Egypt therefore participated 
in the management of Gaza with Hamas, Israel, and 
the Quartet in the midst of heightened fears that the 
situation might escalate.  
The securitization of Egyptian foreign policy has a 
further dimension: the heightened concern among 
Egyptian officials regarding the fight against radical 
groups. There have been genuine concerns about 
religious extremism and state security, especially 
after the war waged in the 1990s between Egyptian 
security forces and thousands of “Egyptian 
Afghans” who had brought jihad back to Egypt. But 
this experience did not result in any decisive diplo-
matic leverage in favor of a counter-terrorism 
agenda in international forums and institutions, 
and was more of a flag brandished at external 
backers (especially the United States) to ensure a 
free hand in domestic matters – a card Hosni 
Mubarak continued to play until the end of his 
regime in February 2011, no doubt with some 
degree of cynicism. Egypt has been enlisted in the 
“war on terror” and has been part of the CIA’s 
clandestine Extraordinary Rendition program, 
which explains why repressive sections of the 
Mubarak regime cast their lot with the most 
criticized programs of the United States. 
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After two terms of George W. Bush’s 
administration, the Obama administration has tried 
to restore the credibility of the United States in the 
Middle East. In 2009, the incoming Obama 
administration wanted to improve relations with a 
number of Arab and Muslim countries after the 
deleterious effects of the outgoing administration’s 
“global war on terror.” In June 2009, President 
Obama, significantly, chose Cairo as the venue for 
his famous speech, a very symbolic move to reach 
out to the Muslim world at the beginning of his 
administration. These symbolic gestures of prime 
importance were accompanied by a flurry of diplo-
matic exchanges, culminating in President Obama’s 
visit to Egypt in June 2009 and President Mubarak’s 
trip to Washington in August 2009 — his first visit 
to the United States since 2004. He was accompa-
nied by his whole cabinet, including intelligence 
chief O. Suleiman and his own son, Gamal. Coinci-
dentally, President Obama had come around to 
viewing Egypt as a peace partner on the Palestinian-
Israeli question. The continuing tensions with Iran 
and Hamas had bolstered Egypt’s position as a 
moderate force, or at least boosted its utility in 
American eyes. In April 2009, the revelation of an 
alleged Hezbollah military cell operating in Egypt 
had heightened tensions with Iran. Egypt also 
expressed concerns about Iran’s support for Hamas, 
its influence in Iraq, and its nuclear program. All 
these had all been issues of heightened concern for 
the United States since 2002.  
The Obama administration elevated Egypt’s 
importance for U.S. foreign policy in the region — a 
measure deeply appreciated by Egyptian officials — 
but without giving Egypt the real means to restore 
its declining diplomatic profile. Egypt found itself 
relegated to a humble role, with no great capacity to 
alter the course of events, despite the Obama 
administration re-engaging forcefully on the 
Palestinian-Israeli question. Egypt has secured 
ceasefire agreements, has mediated numerous 
negotiations between Hamas and Israel over pris-
oner exchanges and other issues, and was 
instrumental in reaching a six-month Israel-Hamas 
ceasefire in June 2008, through the mediation of O. 
Suleiman.  
Egypt strove to make Palestinians attain unity and 
to moderate the conduct of Hamas; it conducted 
multiple rounds of talks and engaged in shuttle 
diplomacy. These are the modest goals Egypt has 
been working toward, but it has not positioned itself 
to be any more than an effective and last minute go-
between. And all Egypt-mediated talks have stalled. 
The blockade on Gaza, the problem of the delivery 
of humanitarian aid to Gaza, the underground 
tunnel economy, and the risk of seeing hungry 
Palestinians breaching the fence in a Gaza under 
siege and pouring through into Egyptian territory 
(as in January 2008) have created headaches for 
Egyptian officials, who have no real ability to offer 
an alternative to Israeli pressures and American 
demands. Egypt was regarded as central when U.S. 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was trying to 
revive the moribund peace talks between Israel and 
the Palestinians in 2009. The very ability of Egypt to 
act, however, is handicapped by the U.S. failure to 
jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as 
exemplified by the end of the ten months Israeli 
moratorium on settlement construction in October 
2010.  
Additionally, recurring doubts remain in the United 
States about the value of Egypt in the region. For a 
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while there has been a strong conviction in the State 
Department that a healthy opening in the otherwise 
ossified Egyptian regime is needed, without which 
the regime would have risked becoming a threat to 
itself and to American interests in the Middle East. 
This type of thinking is not typical in Congress 
however, whose reasoning is more simplistic — 
either seeing Egypt as a close ally or as country to be 
forcefully democratized, by linking American aid to 
democratization benchmarks. In May 2010, the 
Obama administration protested when Egypt 
renewed the state of emergency law in place since 
1981. These publicly issued statements put 
enormous pressure on Egypt, and Egyptian 
diplomats spend precious energy and time trying to 
repair their country’s diplomatic weaknesses. The 
American balancing of private pressures or cautious 
(and very calibrated) public pressures along with 
strong public support for Egypt was increasingly 
substituted by more open criticism along with 
strong overall support for the centrality of Egypt, a 
move that enraged Egyptian officials who have 
equated these actions with outright interference in 
internal Egyptian matters (as revealed by Wikileaks 
cables). 
Another key factor is that in recent years, the 
enduring regional weakening of Egypt can be 
directly related to the weakening of the Egyptian 
state apparatus due to uncertainties at the top. 
There has been a looming succession crisis that has 
weighed on Egypt’s ability to deploy itself regio-
nally. Republican Egypt’s two first presidents built a 
powerful state apparatus despite domestic and 
international constraints and they used many 
stratagems, first of all in foreign and regional policy, 
to buttress their power base and reaffirm themselves 
at the helm of the Egyptian state apparatus. Presi-
dent Mubarak managed the inherited system deftly 
(until February 2011), namely by surviving in power 
despite rising domestic and international pressures, 
the most challenging being the rise of internal 
contestation in Egypt, especially of the Islamist type. 
But the end of Hosni Mubarak’s tenure due to bio-
logical factors (he was born in 1928) proved to be a 
difficult time for Egypt, with ensuing consequences 
on its ability to play its role in the Middle East. 
Decades of authoritarian rule might not have extin-
guished societal protests, but the complex web of 
interests sustaining the regime (the authoritarian 
equilibrium) stifled any change outside state chan-
nels. A new public space let its weight be felt, but it 
was not able to build an alternative. After some 
openings in the 1980s, the Egyptian regime severely 
limited the opportunities for political expression 
(Springborg, 1988; Kienle, 2001). Having exhausted 
alternatives outside the system, the regime was able 
to direct change. Inside the regime, the same tech-
nique of exhaustion of alternatives was at work. 
None of the other power centers commanded the 
necessary resources to push for decisive change: 
each was concentrated in a particular sector or 
institution (even the army); there were competing 
institutions with overlapping domains. Political life 
was largely moribund and the configuration of 
power was tilted towards a tiny elite, among which 
Gamal, the son of the president, was pre-eminent.  
This dearth of potential candidates was best illu-
strated by the political sensation M. El Baradei 
caused when he returned to Cairo in 2010 after a 
12-year tenure in Vienna at the helm of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. The rigged 
November 2010 legislative elections were a clear 
 76 THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
 

signal that the regime was paving the way in 2011 
for a Mubarak candidacy, either father or son. In 
such a political system, succession was a daunting 
challenge. As a corollary, at the time of succession, 
the Egyptian system had become ossified, in line 
with a model well known in the Middle East, exem-
plified by the last years of King Hassan II, King 
Hussein, King Fahd, or Hafez al-Asad. This created 
ripple effects on Egypt’s ability to project itself in 
foreign policy. Of late, the entire Egyptian apparatus 
focused on the issue of President Mubarak’s succes-
sion. Therefore, the ability to act in foreign policy 
was deeply affected by these constraints. 
In February 2011, this equation was reformulated 
with the ousting of President Mubarak. Pent up 
rage and frustration at the repression, corruption, 
and economic hardships that had become the 
hallmark of authoritarian rule crystallized into a 
social movement that removed President Mubarak 
from power. In the transitional process, the army 
was the only remaining functioning institution, and 
when chaos began to loom on the streets of Cairo, 
Alexandria, and Suez (among others), it stepped 
into politics and acted as a midwife for the 
transition process.  
These developments reinforce the extreme 
enfeeblement of the country’s foreign policy. All 
energies are focused on the rebuilding of an Egyp-
tian political system, on the transition from the 
Mubarak regime to another system, and the 
consolidation of that transition. It takes place with 
societal mobilizations having gained a “voice” in the 
process — every sector of Egyptian society is taking 
to the streets, grasping the opportunity afforded by 
the change of regime, with the army (the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces) at the helm, trying to 
reinstate some sense of normalcy. This is the 
fundamental challenge facing Egypt at the time of 
writing (end February 2011). It follows that Egyp-
tian foreign policy will remain static for a while. 
In such a context, the short-term perspectives are 
the most important. A foreign policy statement 
(statement number 4 of February 12, 2011) by the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has made 
clear that “the Arab Republic of Egypt is committed 
to all regional and international obligations and 
treaties,” a direct reference to the Camp David 
agreement between Egypt and Israel. The Muslim 
Brothers, too, have been cautious on this topic. It is 
too early to try to offer analyses as the scenario is 
still unfolding. In this moment of transition, in 
which the obstacles are enormous, a search for 
future prospects seems premature.  
Two opposing trends seem to be gaining strength 
and will be instrumental to future reorientations in 
Egyptian foreign policy. On the one hand, the army 
is at the head of the state and is trying to go back to 
the barracks as soon as possible to save its cohesion, 
even though it is looking for a system that preserves 
its interests. The army, if left alone, will reinstate a 
status quo that will not be so different from that of 
the Mubarak regime, or at least will be very much 
path-dependent on it. On the other hand, with the 
Egyptian populace having gained a “voice” in poli-
tics and wanting to keep this voice, an Egyptian 
system that will be more representative of its society 
will undoubtedly be more assertive in backing the 
Palestinians. And Israel is deeply worried about 
this, having appealed to the United States to back 
Mubarak until the end. A more representative 
Egyptian system will also be less enthusiastic about 
strategic cooperation with the United States than 
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the Mubarak regime, if not on global lines, surely on 
specific Middle Eastern issues, taking a cue from 
Turkey’s more independent foreign policy in the 
2000s. A first litmus test may take place with the 
handling of the border issue between Egypt and 
Gaza: whereby the former regime’s extreme securi-
tization of the Gaza issue (under Omar Suleiman’s 
guidance) may well be seriously revised in the 
future Egyptian foreign policy.
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The events of January-February 2011 have opened a 
new era in Egyptian contemporary history, not least 
because they put an end to the 30-year long presi-
dency of Hosni Mubarak. However, it should be 
kept in mind that while the new regime will likely 
be more populist and allow some political space, at 
least in the short term, the temptation to employ the 
old and deeply rooted formulas of power might be 
hard to break, especially because finding new ways 
to govern would imply a radical change in the 
internal and external balance of power and in the 
distribution of resources between the rulers and the 
ruled. Despite that, the mark left on the Egyptian 
people by the experience of a large and, at least in 
the short term, successful popular mobilization 
should not be underestimated. Even in the likely 
event of a restoration of the regime under the 
watchful eyes of the military, people’s empower-
ment may play out in the years to come in 
unexpected ways.  
Whatever the future power arrangement, the new 
rulers will have to govern a country that is facing 
numerous and pressing problems. From the socio-
economic point of view, as argued in the paper by 
M. Cristina Paciello, over the 2003-07 period, Egypt 
experienced strong economic growth, and a rapid 
increase in exports and foreign direct investment 
inflows. However, the hardships of a large number 
of Egyptians, particularly those belonging to the 
lower middle classes, had increased, implying that 
the benefits of the rapid economic growth had not 
been equitably distributed. The deteriorating socio-
economic situation is fuelling widespread 
discontent, particularly among the youth, as the 
long-sustained workers protests and the recent 
popular upheavals suggest. In order to face Egypt’s 
emerging social question, the new rulers would have 
to radically revise the country economic and social 
reform agenda: prioritizing structural reforms that 
diversify the country’s productive structure; 
mainstreaming a “youth perspective” in economic 
and social strategies, which means, among others, 
implementing economic policies that explicitly 
target job creation for the young or assessing the 
specific impact of economic reforms on the youth; 
making the social welfare system more inclusive 
and progressive; and coping with the problem of 
high food inflation through policies that raise 
agricultural productivity.  
However, coping with socio-economic challenges 
requires, above all, a profound restructuring of the 
country’s political economy so as to deal with wide-
spread corruption and allow a new and independent 
business sector to develop. The reconfiguration of 
Egypt’s political economy will very much depend on 
whether and how political transition proceeds.  
Also, fiscal problems may curb the capacity of 
current and future Egyptian governments to cope 
seriously with the country’s socio-economic chal-
lenges. Despite some improvements in the last 
decade, Egypt suffers from a high budget deficit and 
a large public debt ratio, which worsened as a result 
of the global crisis and the current domestic 
political situation, which in turn fuelled the collapse 
of tourism and a decline in foreign investment. 
Egypt can partially cope with these problems by 
taking recourse to external aid, but this will imply 
that it will have limited leverage in shaping its 
future economic policies. For example, under a 
possible intervention by the IMF and the World 
Bank, Egypt would be forced to restrain its 
expansionary policies, by cutting public expenditure 
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and specifically in eliminating food subsidies, 
privatizing the health insurance system, and 
abandoning the wage bill. If implemented, these 
measures could further damage Egypt socio-
economically and provoke strong opposition from 
the population.  
From a political point of view, Mubarak’s Egypt was 
an apt representation of the neo-authoritarian 
configuration of power prevailing in many less-
developed countries, not only in the Arab World: a 
post-ideological regime with no consensus, reigning 
by coercion and clientelism over a largely disen-
franchised population and fragmented elites 
(military, intelligence, civil services, the 
bureaucracy, technocrats, crony businessmen, 
clans) exchanging internal and geo-political stability 
for foreign patronage in the form of international 
acceptance and economic and military aid. The 
ruling National Democratic Party reflected the 
regime’s neo-authoritarian nature, as has been well 
illustrated by Issandr El Amrani’s paper. During the 
Mubarak presidency, the party was transformed 
into a clientelist machine with no coherent 
ideology. The NDP functioned as a sum of different 
and competing networks of opportunists — rather 
than apparatchiks or loyalists as was the case with 
its forerunner, the Arab Socialist Union of Nasser 
— but ultimately it was unable to conduct its prime 
function as a ruling party: that of being an 
intermediary between the state and the ordinary 
citizen.  
On April 16, the Supreme Administrative Court 
ruled that the party should be dissolved and its 
assets should be seized by the state. But opposition 
forces facing new parliamentary elections rightly 
fear that the NDP’s networks still constitute a 
serious counter-revolutionary challenge. The 
military, particularly if it decides to back a 
particular presidential candidate, can try to create a 
new NDP-like party around which notables and 
apparatchiks will rally. In the best possible scenario, 
the political scene is likely to be fragmented for 
some time and dominated by shifting alliances. 
Electoral politics, hopefully less fraudulent than in 
the past, will then tend to be dominated by ideo-
logical issues in more urban areas, while the families 
and tribes that often dominate rural politics will 
migrate from the now defunct NDP to whatever 
party they believe offers them the most.  
In general, the possibility of an alternative and more 
representative way of governing would depend on 
the capacity of the opposition to significantly alter 
the power base of the regime and the authoritarian 
techniques of control and repression deeply rooted 
in Egyptian society, both at the micro and macro 
levels since the time of British rule. Mubarak, like 
his predecessors, was particularly efficient in 
repressing the emergence of an organized, pluralist, 
and mass-based opposition, thus preventing the 
appearance of a credible alternative to his rule.  
The Muslim Brotherhood for long held a hege-
monic oppositional role, but — as highlighted in 
this author’s paper above — that was more an 
outcome of the general political stagnation and 
regime repression of other opposition forces rather 
than the Brotherhood’s almost mythical 
organizational strength and unbeatable power base.  
The MB today, while it is certainly the most orga-
nized of all the opposition forces, suffers from the 
same malaise characterizing the loyalist opposition 
parties such as the Wafd or the leftist Tagammu’: 
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lack of political initiative, lack of well-defined 
political programs, ossified internal debates and 
dynamics, and, relatively speaking, difficulties in 
organizing a pro-active and fully representative 
mass base.  
After the popular upheaval of the past months, the 
question now is: would the current transition allow 
enough time and political space for the largely 
spontaneous popular movement to form represent-
ative political organizations and parties that can 
compete in elections and bring a balance in the 
political space? It remains to be seen, but the 
balance of power to date is certainly in favor of the 
former ruling elites and political actors, however 
they might disguise or camouflage themselves 
through membership in new organizations. 
Finally, as well explained in Philippe Droz-
Vincent’s paper, Egypt’s international and regional 
role has been on the decline over the last decade, 
increasingly showing signs of passivity and diffi-
culty in pursuing national interests. The 
fundamentals of Egyptian foreign policy have 
remained the same since the late 1970s, as Egypt 
remains firmly entrenched in its triangular relation-
ship with the United States and Israel. Yet Egypt has 
been increasingly unable to act autonomously and 
effectively both for its own and its partners’ sake. 
Current difficulties relate to Egypt’s declining 
economy and the emergence of new regional actors 
such as Turkey and Iran, but also to the rulers lack 
of initiative and capacity, such as in the Horn of 
Africa, where Egypt has vital interests in the flow of 
water from the Nile and from which arena it has 
been conspicuously absent. Also, Egypt has been 
weakened by its domestic difficulties, with all eyes 
initially being turned on President Mubarak’s 
succession and now on the consequences of his 
ousting. The entire state apparatus has long been 
paralyzed due to this transitional period, which has 
had a direct effect on the state’s capacity to define 
its foreign policy.  
Starting from these premises, what could Egypt’s 
Western partners do to help a significant Egyptian 
transition and not just a simple regime recomposi-
tion in new clothing?  
In the last decades, the United States and, generally, 
the Western countries have been prioritizing 
stability and status quo maintenance in the Arab 
region, through their economic, military, and 
political support for authoritarian regimes. At best, 
the Western powers give timid support to gradual 
political reforms, which are implemented top-down 
through the medium of the ruling elites. As well 
illustrated in El Amrani’s paper, for instance, the 
Bush administration was enthusiastic about 
engaging the new technocratic and reform-oriented 
leadership of the NDP around the persona of Gamal 
Mubarak. This strategy clearly ignored the fact that 
factions of the ruling elites might be interested in 
modernizing their system of rule, but not to the 
point of altering the authoritarian status quo that 
grants them their elite privileges. Obviously, 
cosmetic political reform implemented through the 
ruling elites has the advantage of granting political 
continuity, and Western priority up to now has 
been to sustain Western-friendly, “moderate” 
regimes, even if at the cost of democracy.  
Arab regimes are in fact defined as “moderate” and 
“radical” not for their domestic performance, but 
for their foreign policy and, most of all, for their 
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approach toward the conflict in the Middle East and 
toward other Western interests in the region.  
The long debated fear of an Islamist take-over in 
Egypt as elsewhere should be read in this light: the 
problem is not so much the Islamists’ social or reli-
gious conservatism — as demonstrated by the long 
U.S. alliance with ultra conservative Islamist 
regimes such as Saudi Arabia — but precisely their 
supposedly more radical stance on many regional 
issues.  
No doubt, as stated by Droz-Vincent in this report 
— a more representative Egyptian political system 
will probably be less enthusiastic about blind 
strategic cooperation with the United States and 
Israel, if not on global lines, surely on specific 
Middle East issues, taking a cue from Turkey’s more 
independent foreign policy in the 2000s.  
However, the so-called “Arab Spring” has brought 
to the fore the alarming failure of “moderate” 
regimes such as Egypt to implement sustainable 
political and economic development for their 
people. This represents a chance for Western 
policymakers to at least partially re-think their 
policies, and to acknowledge that in the long run 
“stability” cannot be secured by blindly providing 
economic, military, and political support to 
autocratic and ineffective regimes. 
The first steps in a general policy reappraisal could 
be to use conditionality in aid (especially military 
aid) and trade policies to buttress the creation of 
more impartial rules of the game in terms of 
political and civil liberties and respect for human 
rights, and support for substantial legal and consti-
tutional reforms alongside. The focus should be on 
the legal and constitutional framework and not on 
attempting to artificially mould the political land-
scape by financing — for instance through 
programs of “political party development” — or 
opposing specific political groups. Egypt has a long 
tradition of political parties and trade unions and 
with a lasting, more open, and fair political 
environment, much of the distortions in its political 
system — such as the long-feared dominance of the 
opposition by an opaque and conservative Islamist 
organization and the lack of secular credible 
alternatives — will naturally give way to more 
pluralist, dynamic, and representative systems, if 
not in months, then certainly in the years to come.  
Also, as discussed by Paciello and El Amrani in this 
report, the Egyptian experience in the last decade 
demonstrates that political reforms are a pre-requi-
site for equitable and sustainable economic reforms. 
Foreign actors need to admit that, at least in 
strongly inegalitarian societies such as that of Egypt, 
neo-liberal policies become the vehicles of corrup-
tion and tools for the advancement of personal 
interests while simultaneously contributing to the 
marginalization of large sections of society. 
In all future strategies, therefore, more attention 
should be paid to issues of equality and re-distribu-
tion. Moreover, the EU and the United States 
should fundamentally rethink their economic coop-
eration policies vis-à-vis Egypt, by prioritizing job 
creation and a youth perspective in the economic 
reforms they support. 
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